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Healthcare reform is not a singular event, but instead is a con-
stant process that will continue into the foreseeable future. This
article proposes a creative solution to the acrimonious and debili-
tating method we currently use in assessing and implementing
healthcare reform proposals.
Current scholarship has not addressed the systemic problems
that occur in the process of implementing healthcare reform,
tending instead to focus on proposing single reform measures to
cure specific problems or on constitutional problems related to the
Affordable Care Act.' To address that gap, this article carefully
analyzes a case study of Medicare's efforts to control unnecessary
hospital admissions over the course of thirty years-efforts that
have been subjected to almost universal criticism-and uses this
case study to illustrate perennial problems with reform more
generally. This article then explores other cultural and regulatory
processes that function better than healthcare reform in similar
circumstances, specifically the tax regulatory system, and propos-
es a series of changes to healthcare related regulatory processes.
This article's thesis is simple: assuming healthcare reform is a
constant and enduring aspect of the healthcare system, and, in
light of the problems healthcare reform causes, the system needs
* Associate Professor, Health Law and Bioethics, University of South Carolina School
of Law. J.D., LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. The author was a post-doctoral
Greenwall Fellow in Health Policy and Bioethics and a Yale University Donaghue Visiting
Scholar of Research Ethics. The author would like to thank Seth Stoughton, Ann M. Mar-
ciarille, and Alex Ruskell for their comments and Ryan Adams and Tony R. Johnson for
their work as research assistants. This project was presented in an earlier form at the
Health Law Professors Conference in San Francisco in 2014, and the author would like to
thank the attendees for their excellent comments.
1. For an early scholarly treatment of the roots of these issues, see Rand E. Rosen-
blatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J.
243 (1978).
557
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
to be reformed so that it progresses in a manner that is less ad-
versarial, more tolerant of unintended consequences, and better
able to manage the concerns of risk-averse participants.
In any given year, there are more than 136 million visits to the
emergency department, with 16.2 million of those visits resulting
in hospitalization.2 Including those patients admitted from the
emergency department, there are more than 35 million overnight
stays every year in United States hospitals.3 Anything that has a
substantial impact on those visits matters tremendously for vast
swaths of people, obviously for the patients and their families, but
also for the healthcare system.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS")4 has
long believed that many patients are unnecessarily admitted to
the hospital and for decades it has sought to find a method to re-
duce these admissions.5 As discussed in Parts I and II of this arti-
cle, observation status has gradually emerged as an unhappy
middle ground, a status of coverage for hospital stays that reduc-
es third-party payer costs but consistently creates turmoil. When
a patient who is a member of Medicare is admitted to the hospital
as a regular admission, their care is covered under Medicare Part
A.6 The benefits are fairly generous and the patient has limited
out-of-pocket expenses based on the entire admission as one event
with one copayment.' If the hospital stay is considered observa-
tion (commonly referred to as observation status), it is billed
through Medicare Part B as an outpatient service, even though
the patient is staying in the hospital, perhaps in a bed right next
to a patient who is an admission.8 Under Part B, the hospital and
physician are paid less than under Part A, and the patients have
2. Hospital Utilization (in Non-Federal Short-Stay Hospitals), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/hospital.htm (last visited Dec.
1, 2015).
3. See id.
4. For continuity purposes, the title CMS will be used in this article to refer to CMS
and previous federal agencies that had responsibility for the Medicare program.
5. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Better Care, Smarter
Spending, Healthier People: Improving Our Health Care Delivery System (Jan. 26, 2015),
https://www.cms.govfNewsroom/MediaReleaseDatabaseFact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets.item
s/2015-01-26.html.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012).
7. See id. § 1395d.
8. See id. § 1395k; see also DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ARE YOU A HOSPITAL
INPATIENT OR OUTPATIENT? (2014), https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/l1435.pdf.
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far higher out-of-pocket costs.9 Further complicating the matter,
when hospitalized under Part B, patients are not entitled to cov-
erage for rehabilitative nursing home care once they leave the
hospital."° So, if care is required, patients can end up paying tens
of thousands of dollars in unexpected costs, costs that would have
been fully reimbursed under Part A."
The origins of observation have nothing to do with insurance
coverage. Starting before the Medicare program was created in
1965, emergency departments kept patients in the hospital to
watch them when doctors were unsure of the correct diagnosis
but they seemed too ill to send home.' For short-term observa-
tion, a patient would stay in the emergency department itself. 
13
For longer stays, the patient would be admitted.4
During the 1980s, hyperinflation in healthcare, coupled with
unprecedented growth in patient use of hospitals, led CMS to fo-
cus on cost5 and, in particular, on unnecessary hospital admis-
sions.6 CMS began to scrutinize hospital admissions to determine
if they were appropriate and gradually became more willing to re-
fuse coverage after the fact.'7 Patients were increasingly kept in
observation in the emergency department, with hospitals unwill-
9. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ARE YOU A HOSPITAL INPATIENT OR
OUTPATIENT? (2014), https://www.medicare.govPubs/pdf/11435.pdf; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k
(2012).
10. See What Part B Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-
covers/part-b/what-medicare-part-b-covers.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
11. Compare id., with What Part A Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/
what-medicare-covers/part-a/what-part-a-covers.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
12. SOC'Y OF HOSP. MED., PUB. POLICY COMM., THE OBSERVATION STATUS PROBLEM:
IMPACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 2,4 (2014), http://webcache.googleusercon
tent.com/search?q-cache:UE9vtBZ zVoJ:www.hospitalmedicine.org/observation+&cd=2&
hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [hereinafter THE OBSERVATION STATUS PROBLEM].
13. Zhanlian Feng, Brad Wright & Vincent Mor, Sharp Rise in Medicare Enrollees
Being Held in Hospitals for Observation Raises Concerns About Causes and Consequences,
31 HEALTH AFF. 1251, 1252 (2012).
14. THE OBSERVATION STATUS PROBLEM, supra note 12, at 4.
15. See Gregory Acs & John Sabelhaus, Trends in Out-of-Pocket Spending on Health
Care, 1980-92, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 35, 37, 43 (1995), http:/fbls.gov/mlr/1995/12/art4full.
pdf; see also Rising Health Care Costs: What Factors Are Driving Increases?, ASS'N OF
WASH. HEALTHCARE PLANS 2-4, http://www.awhp-online.com/issues/AWHPRisingHealth
CareCosts_7-26-04.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
16. Carel T. Hedlund & Thomas W. Coons, CMS Revises Part B Billing Policy for Un-
necessary Inpatient Admissions, PAYMENT MATTERS (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.ober.com/
publications/2l59-cms-revises-part-b-billing-policy-unnecessary-inpatient-admissions (di -
cussing CMS Ruling 1455-R).
17. Id.
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ing to risk admitting them until a formal diagnosis was made
that could be used to justify admission to CMS.1' For a few of the-
se years, up to the mid-1990s, CMS was unwilling to pay for ob-
servation as a separate charge, allowing doctors to bill for their
treatment and for diagnostic services but not for the use of a
bed.'9
By 2010, hospitals and CMS were in an entrenched battle over
patient status in the hospital. Starting with a pilot program in
2003,20 which expanded nationally by 2008, CMS entered into
contracts with Recovery Audit Contractors ("RAC") who were
paid for their services with a percentage of hospital charges they
overturned and collected back for the government.2' The CMS
regulations governing observation and admission status were ex-
tremely unclear, making the admission status of the patient a
soft target for the auditors who could then collect a bounty for
each admission they overturned.2  The turmoil led to extensive
complaints and, eventually, congressional hearings .
In 2013, CMS, in an attempt o clarify how hospitals and doc-
tors should bill Medicare for patient admissions, promulgated a
regulation that quickly came to be known as the "Two Midnight
Rule."24 This regulation, in turn, unleashed a high volume of criti-
18. Nathan R. Hoot & Dominik Aronsky, Systematic Review of Emergency Department
Crowding: Causes, Effects, and Solutions, 52 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 126, 129
(2008), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/piSO196064408006069.
19. Concurrently, and entirely unconnected to CMS concerns, studies began to show
that patients with certain conditions, particularly chest pain, did extremely well if treated
for short stays in a dedicated observation unit that was attached to the emergency de-
partment. This promising data has been completely pushed aside, lost in the appropriation
of observation as a billing concept, rather than a treatment concept.
20. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 423.150 (2005)).
21. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., New Report Shows CMS Pi-
lot Program Saving Nearly $700 Million in Improper Medicare Payments (July 11, 2008),
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2008-Press-release
es-items/2008-07-1 .html.
22. See 42 C.F.R. § 455.500 (2014).
23. Erica Stocker, House Lawmakers Introduce RAC Reform Legislation, WASH.
HEALTH CARE WEEK (May 7, 2015), http://www.anad.orglwp-content/uploads/2012/04/
Health-Care-Update-May-7-2015.pdf.
24. Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute
Care Hospitals and the Long Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal
Year 2014 Rates; Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers; Hospital Condi-
tions of Participation; Payment Policies Related to Patient Status, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496
(Aug. 19, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412-14, 419, 424, 482, 485, 489); Amanda
Cassidy, The Two-Midnight Rule, HEALTH AFF. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.healthaf
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cism, building on the already existing anger among divergent
stakeholders about how Medicare policies in this area were al-
ready causing turmoil and financial strain for the healthcare sys-
tem and for the elderly." Federal legislation was quickly passed
that delayed the regulation's implementation.26 It appears that
the Two Midnight Rule has now been supplanted, as of July 1,
2015, by another CMS proposal that seeks to ameliorate some of
the more egregious problems that have arisen.27
Much has been written about the Two Midnight Rule and the
problems that CMS decisions about observation status have
caused patients.28 The problem, however, extends beyond the cur-
rent regulatory complexities. Observation status as it is used now
is a creature of cost containment29 and has lost much of its prior
connection to patient care. The entire concept has become ques-
tionable and needs to be re-examined.
As discussed in Part IV of this article, an examination of obser-
vation status opens the door to the extraordinarily complex in-
terweaving of problems and challenges that occur throughout the
healthcare system and have done so for decades: increasingly sick
patient populations;" growing patient populations generally;3"
fairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief id=133.
25. See, e.g., Stephanie Masaba, Diagnosed with Time Is Money: Arbitrary Medicare
Provisions Differentiating Observation Services from Inpatient Admissions Violate Benefi-
ciaries'Due Process Rights, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1185 (2015); J.D. Thomas, What's
Past Is Prologue: Health Care Fraud Enforcement and What's Ahead for 2015, 17 J.
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 9 (2015); Rachel A. Polzin, Comment, Short-Stay, Under Ob-
servation, or Inpatient Admission?-How CMS' Two Midnight Rule Creates More Confu-
sion & Concern, 8 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 147 (2014).
26. Extension of Two-Midnight Rule, Pub. L. No. 113-93, § 111, 128 Stat. 1044 (Apr. 1,
2014).
27. Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory
Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs; Short Inpatient Hos-
pital Stays; Transition for Certain Medicare-Dependent, Small Rural Hospitals Under the
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,200 (July 8, 2015) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410, 412, 416, 419).
28. See, e.g., Jonathan W. Padish, Distinction Without A Difference: Reforming the
Medicare Three-Day Qualifying Stay Rule for SNF Care, 21 ELDER L.J. 465, 466 (2013);
Lori J. Parker, Observing Observational Status - Auditors and Inequities, 16 MARQ.
ELDER'S ADVISOR 83, 83 (2014).
29. Zack Budryk, Complex Observation-Status Rules Complicate Patient Care,
FIERCEHEALTHFINANCE (Apr. 21, 2015), http:/www.fiercehealthfinance.comlstory/complex
-observation-status-rules-complicate-patient-care/2015-04-
21.
30. Deepak Asudani & Vaishal Tolia, Pros and Cons of Clinical Observation Units,
THE HOSPITALIST (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.the-hospitalist.org/article/pros-and-cons-of-
clinical-observation-units.
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struggles with scarce resources;" rampant inflation in medical
care and health insurance;33 the use of financial incentives to mo-
tivate healthcare providers and the unpredictability of how those
incentives will actually play out in the market place;34 deep dis-
trust and lack of effective communication between payers and
healthcare providers;35 unintended consequences of legislative
and regulatory actions;36 and the extreme risk aversion of both
physicians and hospitals, leading to provider behavior that can
frustrate the intent of regulators.37
The conflicts and limitations of the healthcare system are not
going away. The human condition, whereby people are both frail
and ultimately mortal, makes it impossible for a healthcare sys-
tem to do more than imperfectly delay death. Against this grim
set of background conditions, the societal desire to heal injury
and illness leads to constant innovation,38 making it impossible to
determine the resources necessary to provide health care to a
population. Further adding to the shifting sands, new diseases
consistently emerge.39 Both innovation and newly emerging dis-
31. Robert W. Derlet & John R. Richards, Overcrowding in the Nation's Emergency
Departments: Complex Causes and Disturbing Effects, 35 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 63,
64 (2000).
32. See id. at 65 (noting that some hospitals around the country suffer from over-
crowding due to lack of beds for admitted patients and a shortage of nurses, administra-
tive staff, and clerical support).
33. See id. at 67 (explaining that hospitals "cost shift" expenses incurred from nonpay-
ing patients to paying and insured patients because healthcare providers are unwilling to
cover emergency departments' increased expenses).
34. See id.; Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the
Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 145, 170 (2004) (assessing the possible use of government subsidies to reim-
burse physicians at primary care facilities above the cost of treatment so that emergency
healthcare centers are used as a last resort).
35. See Derlet & Richards, supra note 31, at 65-67 (discussing the dissatisfaction of
patients due to faulty communication channels with hospitals and third-party payers).
36. See id. at 67 (noting that the federal government contributes to the problem by
requiring emergency departments to pay for all patients with medical emergencies with-
out compensating physicians or hospitals).
37. See id. at 66 (describing how the increase of paperwork that physicians are re-
quired to complete at the request of insurance providers and the Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA") shortens the amount of hands-on time physicians can spend
with patients).
38. For an excellent description of the challenges presented by medical innovation for
Medicare, see Sean R. Tunis & Steven D. Pearson, Coverage Options For Promising Tech-
nologies: Medicare's 'Coverage With Evidence Development,' 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1218
(2006), http://content.healthaffairs.orgtcontent25/5/1218.full.pdf+htm.
39. Tracking and identifying the emergence of new infectious diseases is a significant
[Vol. 50:557
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eases add scope to what health care is tasked with accomplishing.
Finally, societal norms and values continue to shift, leading to
ever-changing notions of wellness, personal responsibility, gov-
ernmental responsibility, and what health care ought to encom-
40pass.
Given the constant complexities and conflicts within health
care, healthcare reform also needs to be recognized as "a con-
stant," a term used to describe the apparently endless grappling
with shifting sands in an effort to direct an unruly system to-
wards greater quality, lower cost, and greater access. Healthcare
reform is not a single undertaking that will somehow emerge vic-
torious with all problems solved. Unless something truly radical
changes about the nature of being human, the problems will nev-
er be solved and society will continually seek better answers.
This article proposes that it is time for all stakeholders in the
healthcare system to recognize that incremental change will be
the norm (even if a single increment may have breathtaking
scope) and adapt to it. Attempts to regulate a shifting system will
always generate unintended consequences, and many of those, in
turn, will not be optimal.41 Some may even be horrible. Financial
and other incentives will always be unruly, as autonomous hu-
man actors and marketplaces will conceive of responses that were
never imagined by those who sought to create the incentive struc-
ture in the first place.
In the face of the problems that reform will always generate,
the system needs to take constant change into account, much as
the tax system does. The regulators (a term used broadly here)
need to become more nimble in order to respond effectively to
shifting conditions and unintended consequences. The ffective-
ness of the response will depend on information from providers.
The goal should be constant, open, and honest communication
part of the role of public health organizations. See, e.g., Pandemic and Epidemic Diseases,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/enl (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (noting
that the World Health Organization's Twelfth Programme of Work aims to reduce the
mortality and societal disruption caused by epidemics). For a current example of emerging
diseases, see Disease Outbreak News (DONs), WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
csr/don/en/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
40. For examples of these shifting norms, see infra notes 271-72.
41. Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html (last visit-
ed Dec. 1, 2015).
2016]
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among stakeholders. Attorneys need to take a more active role in
healthcare planning, acting as constant advisors to healthcare
providers, identifying and communicating client concerns to regu-
lators, and working to devise increasingly effective methods for
doing so. These communications can help rationalize the system
by reducing inappropriate reactions by risk-averse healthcare
providers, which, in turn, can help reduce the gap between what
a regulation permits and what the regulated are actually doing.
The changes described above also require a less adversarial
stance among participants. When it is counterproductive to be
adversarial, stakeholders in health care need to quickly identify
and step back from condemnatory postures that undermine the
communication that is necessary to continually nudge health care
in the right direction. While actual criminals do seek to exploit
the healthcare system for financial gain, they are rare. Not every
mistake is fraud,42 and not everything that costs an unprecedent-
ed amount of money is caused by greed. Most people involved in
the healthcare system do care about people, and this needs to
stay uppermost in people's minds and expectations.
This article suggests that the United States tax regime is a
useful model for accomplishing many of the changes suggested
here. While the tax regime is not perfect, it does many things
right. Its culture accepts complexity and constant change as a
norm.43 Many aspects of this system-such as opinion letters is-
sued by attorneys, private letter rulings issued by the IRS, 5 and
42. This statement is intuitively true, but the author realizes that determining the
causes of errors in billing is exceedingly difficult. See, e.g., Letter from Shaun Donovan,
Dir., Exec. Office of the President, to The Honorable Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/232
2973-pages-from-r-combined-sixth-interim-response.html.
43. The federal tax code changes hundreds of times per year, while regulatory struc-
tures must grapple with both code changes and taxpayer changes. See TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG. (VOLUME 1), THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TAX
CODE 3-4 (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas-arcmsp-l.pdf.
44. Patricia B. Hsue, Comment, Lessons from United States v. Stein: Is the Line Be-
tween Criminal and Civil Sanctions for Illegal Tax Shelters A Dot?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
903, 911 (2008)
45. Judy S. Kwok, The Perils of Bright Lines: Section 6110(k)(3) and the Ambiguous
Precedential Status of Written Determinations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 863, 868 (2005) ("A
P[rivate] L[etter] R[uling] is a written statement by the National Office, prepared in re-
sponse to a written request from a taxpayer that states how it will treat a prospective or
completed transaction for federal tax purposes. A taxpayer may generally rely, if doing so




revenue rulings issued by the IRS," which allow participants to
proceed with some assurances of legality-can be adapted by the
healthcare system. These tools would help achieve the changes
described above by allowing for a less adversarial and less puni-
tive system.47
This article consists of five components: the introduction, which
gives a brief description of the case study and theory of reform;
Parts I and II contain a case study about observation status; Part
I is about the evolution of hospital-based patient observation in
the face of scarce resources, particularly the time between 1965
and 2000; Part II examines what occurred after the introduction
of bounty-incentivized claims auditing; Part III contains the au-
thor's proposal for a theoretical framework for achieving more ef-
fective incremental healthcare reform; and the conclusion.
I. THE FIRST EVOLUTION OF HOSPITAL-BASED PATIENT
OBSERVATION IN THE FACE OF SCARCE RESOURCES, 1965-2000
Observation status has proven to be an effective method of
providing care,4" but it has also been, for some time, highly prob-
lematic from a policy perspective. It is helpful to look at the evo-
lution of the practice to more fully understand its current com-
plexity.
A. What Is Observation?
Observation occurs when a physician in a hospital emergency
department lacks sufficient information to recommend a course of
treatment for a patient and wishes to engage in watchful waiting
for a period of time in order to make a more informed determina-
tion as to the illness or injury, see what other symptoms emerge,
and judge if the patient is medically stable and therefore able to
be released.49 Throughout most of the twentieth century, patients
46. 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (2015).
47. See, e.g., Hsue, supra note 44, at 912 (discussing how the use of opinion letters
allows tax attorneys to avoid liability and tax advisors to reasonably disagree on what
type of treatment a transaction should receive under the tax code).
48. See Asudani & Tolia, supra note 30.
49. See Christopher W. Baugh, Arjun K. Venkatesh & Stephen J. Bohan, Emergency
Department Observation Units: A Clinical and Financial Benefit for Hospitals, 36 HEALTH
CARE MGMT. REV. 28 (2011), http://www.nursingcenter.com/journalarticle?ArticleID=1 10
20161
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under observation would often be admitted to an acute care hos-
pital if a room were available. The hospital stay would be covered
by the patient's insurance under the theory that monitoring the
development of the diagnosis, once it reaches a certain level of
acuity, is an insurable event.5 ° Historically, health insurance
plans provided care on a fee-for-service basis, meaning that doc-
tors determined the care the patients required and the insurance
companies would reimburse the doctors for providing "reasonably
necessary" care.5" Courts, reluctant to intrude in the doctor/
patient relationship, generally interpreted this language so that a
treating physician's order that a patient be hospitalized for ob-
servation was sufficient evidence that the care was "reasonably
necessary," thus satisfying contractual terms.52
B. Rapid Change in Healthcare Dynamics from the 1970s to the
1980s
The medical and payment dynamic for hospital-based observa-
tion is radically different now. Beginning in the 1970s, health
care experienced a steady and worrisome increase in cost.53 This
increase, combined with an equally steady increase in treat-
ments, began to seem like a crisis by the mid-1980s.54 By that
point, the number of insured people was dropping due to the in-
creased cost of care," even as the cost borne by the Medicare pro-
gram and employers who provided health insurance was growing.
While there have been numerous times in American history when
governments and private parties attempted to both increase qual-
ity of care and make care more accessible,56 the flurry of activity
1967.
50. See A Patient's Guide to Observation Care, ILL. HOSP. ASS'N, http://www.ihatoday.
orgluploaddocs/l/observationstayguidelines.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
51. See Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions, Transparency
and Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 12-13.
54. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER, fig.1 (2012),
http://kff.orglreport-section/health-care-costs-a-primer-2012-report/ (stating that the rate
of medical spending, per capita, increased from $1110 in 1980 to $2854 in 1990, and up to
$4878 in 2000, but has not had a similar percentage hike since then.)
55. Robin A. Cohen et al., Health Insurance Coverage Trends, 1959-2007: Estimates
from the National Health Interview Survey, 17 NAT'L HEALTH STAT. REP. 1, 5 (2009), http:
//www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsrO17.pdf.
56. Examples of this would include such disparate activities as the founding of the
[Vol. 50:557
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in private markets, state and federal legislatures, and federal
agencies that occurred during the late 1980s in response to rapid
healthcare inflation can arguably be seen as the beginning of the
modern era of healthcare reform." It is here that one can see the
roots of the challenges the current healthcare system faces with
regards to observation.
Because of both the market and legal changes, the late 1980s
and early 1990s was a time of extraordinary turmoil in the Amer-
ican healthcare system, particularly for emergency departments
and hospitals more generally.8 During this time, there was a rap-
id increase in patients choosing emergency departments for
treatment9 Within the medical field, the possible causes for the
increase and the appropriate responses were fiercely debated, but
no consensus was ever reached.° The number of hospital beds for
admitted patients had been steadily decreasing up to this point,6
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in 1901, see JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT
INFLUENZA: THE EPIc STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY 72, 79, 82 (2005); the
creation of the first Blue Cross health insurance plan in 1929, see Melissa A. Thomasson,
From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth Century Development of U.S. Health Insurance, 39
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 233, 237 (2002); and the creation of Medicare and Medicaid
in 1965, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012).
57. See Timeline: History of Health Reform in the U.S., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (May 2, 2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/5-02-13-
history-of-health-reform.pdf/; see also William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive Strat-
egies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 146 (2004).
58. For a contemporary and detailed discussion of these problems, see Erik J. Olson,
No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L. REV. 449,
451, 453-55 (1994).
59. According to an article published in 1990, the increase in patient use of emergency
departments was extraordinarily high, with the authors stating that "although inpatient-
care volume has declined 5 to 10 percent since 1984, the E[mergency] D[epartment] vol-
ume has increased 40 to 60 percent in the typical inner-city hospital." Steven R. Eastaugh
& Janet A. Eastaugh, Putting the Squeeze on Emergency Medicine: The Many Pressures on
Today's ED, 68 HOSP. TOPICS 21, 21 (1990). Volume across the country increased by an
additional 14% from 1992 to 1999, "mainly due to an increase in visits for illness-related
as opposed to injury-related conditions." Linda F. McCaig & Catharine W. Burt, Trends in
Hospital Emergency Department Utilization: United States, 1992-99, 13 VITAL & HEALTH
STAT. 1, 1 (2001), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/dataIseries/sr_13/srl31l5O.pdf.
60. In retrospect, it was a very complex situation that resulted from numerous chang-
es in the healthcare delivery system. One interesting statistic is that the number of people
visiting emergency departments because of injury was actually dropping over this period
of time, even as the number of people who needed medical management of illness steadily
increased. This may have been one the first signals alerting us to the system's continuing
problems with managing chronic conditions. See McCaig & Burt, supra note 59, at 1.
61. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HOSPITALS, BEDS, AND OCCUPANCY RATES, BY TYPE
OF OWNERSHIP AND SIZE OF HOSPITAL: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS 1975-2009,
(2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalhus/2011/116.pdf.
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even as emergency department utilization increased.62 By 1990, it
had become a common occurrence for all hospital beds to be filled
and for patients to be left on stretchers in the emergency depart-
ment until beds were available for them, further increasing
crowding and taxing resources.3 As further evidence of over-
crowding, it was also common for these departments to contact
ambulance services and ask to have no more patients brought in
until the crowding decreased, a process known as diversion.64
C. The Changing Environment for Emergency Departments:
Prospective Payment Systems, Managed Care, and EMTALA
The 1980s saw high levels of medical inflation and a sharp re-
duction in the percentage of Americans who had access to
healthcare due to a drop in both the percentage of Americans
with health insurance and the increasing inability of people to
pay, by themselves, for the medical care they received.5 The
emergency department was becoming the last option for those
seeking care.6 Against the backdrop of crowded and stressed
emergency departments, three changes in the healthcare system
are key to understanding the complexities surrounding observa-
tion care: Prospective Payment System ("PPS");"7 the rapid ex-
62. See D.P. Andrulis et al., Emergency Departments and Crowding in United States
Teaching Hospitals, 20 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 980, 982 (1991). The federal govern-
ment did not begin tracking emergency department utilization until 1992, when the num-
bers show a continual growth in utilization since then, with, for example, a 20% increase
between 1992 and 2000. A.B. BERNSTEIN, HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: TRENDS IN
UTILIZATION 32 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/miscfhealthcare.pdf.
63. Andrulis, supra note 62, at 982.
64. See R.J. Lagoe & M.S. Jastremski, Relieving Overcrowded Emergency Depart-
ments Through Ambulance Diversion, 68 HOSP. TOPICS 23, 23, 24-26 (1990).
65. Cohen et al., supra note 55, at 6; see also Cynthia G. Tudor, Medicaid Expendi-
tures and State Responses, 16 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 1 (1995), http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4193516/; Kevin Drum, A Longer Look at Medical Inflation,
MOTHER JONES (June 18, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drumI/2013/06/longer-
look-medical-inflation.
66. Sean McNeeley, Urgent Care Centers: An Overview, 9 AM. J. CLINICAL MED. 80, 80
(2012), http://www.aapsus.org/wp-content/uploads/ucc80.pdf.
67. The Prospective Payment System was developed, passed into law, and then im-
plemented by regulation extraordinarily quickly, with perhaps one year between the first
law and the final regulation being put into place. The Payment System was first intro-
duced in a tax law passed in 1982 requiring the HCFA to develop a prospective payment
system. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
After HCFA drafted a proposal, it was passed into law on April 20, 1983. Social Security
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, tit. VI, 97 Stat. 65, 149. An interim final regula-
tion was published in the Federal Register on September 1, 1983, 'Medicare Program;
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pansion of managed care plans; and the passage of the Emergen-
cy Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA")."
The PPS system was created in an effort to control the rapidly
increasing costs of hospital care for Medicare.9 These costs had
been increasing by roughly 19% a year for the three years prior to
the introduction of the new payment system." PPS is a payment
system that determines hospital charges at the time a patient is
discharged by using flat fees based on the Diagnostic Related
Groups ("DRG"), codes that describe the condition(s) a patient
was treated for, which in turn have reimbursement rates associ-
ated with them.71 This system created a set of financial incentives
meant to counterbalance those within the fee-for-service system.72
In fee-for-service, a care provider is paid for every medical inter-
action with a patient.3 Under PPS, the care provider retains more
profit by having fewer, shorter, and less intense interactions if
those interactions are sufficient to treat the underlying medical
condition." The hope is that a reasonable amount of care is pro-
vided and, absent financial incentives to unnecessarily complicate
treatment, that the cost is controlled. The new payment system
was gradually rolled out across the country and became a nation-
al system for Medicare reimbursement o hospitals by 1988.' 5
Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient Hospital Services." 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752-
39,890 (Sept. 1, 1983). The final rule was published in the Federal Register in January
1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 234 (Jan. 3, 1984).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
69. Learning from Medicare: Prospective Payment, HEALTH CARE FINANCING & ORG.
(May 2011), http://www.hcfo.org/publications/learning-medicare-prospective-payment.
70. Judith Mistichelli, Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) and the Prospective Payment
System: Forecasting Social Implications, SCOPE NOTE 4, at 1 (1984), https://repository.li
brary.georgetown.edulbitstream/handle/10822/556896/sn4.pdf.
71. Id.
72. ELIAS N. MATSAKIS, ROD ST. CLAIR & JOHN L. BENDER, AM. MED. ASS'N., CHAPTER
14: EVOLVING COMPENSATION METHODOLOGIES FOR EMPLOYED PHYSICIANS IN AN ERA OF




73. Fee-for-Service, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
information/by-topics/delivery-systems/fee-for-service.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
74. Mistichelli, supra note 70, at 6.
75. Id. at 2.
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In response to patient overcrowding coupled with patient ina-
bility to pay, hospitals resorted to refusing to treat or transferring
unwanted patients, a practice commonly referred to as patient
dumping.7" EMTALA is the federal law that requires all emergen-
cy departments to stabilize all people who show up at their doors,
without regard for the patient's ability to pay.77 The financial
penalties for failing to do so could be severe for both doctors and
hospitals, making EMTALA a key tool to prevent patient dump-
ing. s Once patients presented themselves to an emergency de-
partment, the hospital had to provide appropriate treatment
within EMTALA parameters or risk violating federal law. 9 Sig-
nificantly, EMTALA did not require that an acute care hospital
have an emergency department at all."0 The rising number of fa-
cilities either never operating an emergency department or clos-
ing them escalated,8' while the financial and compliance burden
on those covered by EMTAIA also escalated.82
The advent of managed care combined with EMTAIA created a
complex scenario for physician and hospital decision making re-
garding observation of patients. The advent of managed care is
relevant because the health insurance contracts for managed care
plans reserve far greater rights to the third-party payer-the in-
surance company-to determine medical necessity than the earli-
er fee-for-service contracts did.3 This power is considered an es-
76. Lynn Healey Scaduto, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
Gone Astray: A Proposal to Reclaim EMTALA for Its Intended Beneficiaries, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 943, 943, 945 (1999).
77. Id. at 946 n.8 (quoting KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, 3 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE &
INSTRUCTIONS § 110.08 (4th ed. 1997)). Congress enacted EMTALA in the face of "the in-
creasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept to treat
patients with emergency condition if the patient does not have medical insurance." Reyn-
olds v. MaineGeneral Health, 218 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
42, 605).
78. Scaduto, supra note 76, at 951-52.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2012).
80. Id.
81. The number of emergency departments has steadily declined since then, from
4998 in 1993 to 4440 in 2013. See AM. HOSP. ASS'N, CHARTBOOK: TRENDS AFFECTING
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS tbl.3.3 (2015), http://www.aha.org/researchIreports/tw/
chartbook/index.shtml.
82. Jeffrey Rowes, EMTALA: OIG/HCFA Special Advisory Bulletin Clarifies
EMTALA, American College of Emergency Physicians Criticizes It, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
90, 91 (2000) (estimating that, as of 2000, the cost of compliance with EMTALA was al-
ready between $10 billion and $27 billion).
83. See John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Physicians and the Growth of Man-
aged Care, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1167, 1167 (1994).
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sential part of managed care.84 Supporters of managed care argue
that traditional fee-for-service plans encourage doctors to over-
utilize care because the doctors are financially incentivized to do
so, given that they are paid for all medical care they provide.85
Managed care gatekeeping is meant to counterbalance this incen-
tive by having the payer assess whether the proposed treatment
is truly necessary for the patient's care."
While managed care concepts were gathering steam in the
United States during the 1970s and 1980s, the percentage of peo-
ple enrolled in some form of a managed care plan rather than a
fee-for-service plan exploded between 1987 and 1991, and it has
only increased since then.7 For example, currently, less than 1%
of people with employer-sponsored health insurance have plans
that are not managed care plans.88 Contemporary managed care
plans come in a variety of formats, and managed care is best un-
derstood as an umbrella term that covers most modern insurance
plans, all of which have cost containment mechanisms. The in-
creased market share of managed care plans coupled with these
plans' ability to refuse to pay for care that was ordered by a treat-
ing physician inserted third-party payers firmly in the middle of
hospital decision making.89
As managed care rapidly spread across the country, it began to
suffer from a significant image problem. Much was written in ac-
ademic literature and the popular press about problems with
managed care during this time period, particularly Health
84. See id.
85. Gerald B. Hickson, William A. Altemeier & James M. Perrin, Physician Reim-
bursement by Salary or Fee-for-Service: Effect on Physician Practice Behavior in a Ran-
domized Prospective Study, 80 PEDIATRICS 344, 344 (1987).
86. Douglas A. Mains, Alberto Coutasse & Kristine Lykens, Physician Incentives:
Managed Care and Ethics, 2 INTERNET J. OF L., HEALTHCARE & ETHICS 1, 1-2 (2003), http:
//ispub.com/IJLHE/2/1/12416 (describing managed care utilization of primary care physi-
cian gatekeepers to determine appropriateness of proposed care for patient).
87. For example, "[1987 to 1993] witnessed a 100% increase in HMO enrollment, with
2.2 million having been added in 1991 alone." LES SEPLAKI, COST AND COMPETITION IN
AMERICAN MEDICINE: THEORY, POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS 180 (1994). For a chart showing
the change in types of enrollment for people who receive health insurance through their
employers, see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2014 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS
SURVEY, Exhibit E (2014), http://kff.org/report-sectionlehbs-2014-summary-of-findings/.
88. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2014 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY,
Exhibit E (2014), http://kff.orglreport-section/ehbs-2014-summary-of-findings/.
89. Id.; Rowes, supra note 82, at 90, 91.
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Maintenance Organizations ("HMO")." ° These companies became
renowned in the 1990s for controlling costs and protecting profits
by aggressively preventing patients from accessing medical care."
One of the tools for doing this was the prior authorization re-
quirement: patients were required to have all interactions with
the medical establishment pre-approved by the payer before the
patient could receive covered care.9" This requirement originally
included emergency treatment and all hospital admissions. 93 Re-
quiring pre-authorization for emergency treatment was a deeply
unpopular part of managed care.94 As the 1990s progressed, the
managed care industry was threatened with federal legislation
that would specifically prohibit requiring pre- authorization for
90. For an example in popular culture, the movie As Good As It Gets (TriStar Pictures
1997) contains a scene where the heroine decries horrible HMOs. This scene was reported
at the time to have generated widespread applause from audiences. David S. Hilzenrath,
Art Imitates Life When It Comes to Frustration with HMOs, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1998/02/10/art-imitates-life-when-it-co
mes-to-frustration-with-hmos/86c2f39b-blaa-47ba-b7e-77651424f6b8/; see also Samuel H.
Zuvekas & Joel W. Cohen, Paying Physicians by Capitation: Is the Past Now Prologue?, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1661, 1661 (2010), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/9/1661.full ("[In
the 1990s,] HMOs' use of prior authorization, gatekeepers, and other managed care tech-
niques produced a backlash among consumers and providers.").
91. Zuvekas & Cohen, supra note 90, at 1661, 1663.
92. Rowes, supra note 82, at 91; Zuvekas & Cohen, supra note 90, at 1661.
93. It is helpful to recall how profoundly ugly the emergency pre-authorization re-
quirement could get. See, e.g., Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of
Changes in the Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforce-
ment, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 145, 147 (2004) (describing gruesome media accounts of "pa-
tient dumping" resulting in great harm to patients, including a pregnant women). For ex-
ample, many HMOs would not allow a patient to receive emergency care of any kind
without prior precertification, and would also, once contacted by the person having an ac-
tive medical emergency, attempt to direct patients to hospitals that were in the HMO's
network (thus controlling costs), even if there was an emergency department that was
closer to the patient. Id. at 147-48. Not surprisingly, many of these situations resulted in
damage to patients who were delayed care due to these conditions. Id. at 148. If an em-
ployer provided the insurance coverage, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") would prevent the patient from suing for damages due to the ERISA preemp-
tion. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012). However, a notable case from this time period, brought
by a family that had individual coverage, highlights what was known at the time as "tele-
phone triage" and the damages it caused. See Thomas William Malone, Changes in Medi-
cine-An Overview of Handling Medical Negligence Cases for the Past 30 Years, 1 ANN.
2001 ATLA-CLE 1177 (2001). See generally Rob Rosenbaum, End H.M.O. 'Telephone Tr-
age" Pass the Patients' Rights Bill, OBSERVER (June 25, 2001), http://observer.com/2001/
06/end-hmo-telephone-triage-pass-the-patients-rights-bill/ (discussing "telephone triage"
as a euphemism for HMO abuse).
94. Managed care suffered from a terrible reputation by the end of the 1990s. See gen-
erally George J. Church, Backlash Against HMOs: Doctors, Patients, Unions, Legislators
Are Fed Up and Say They Won't Take It Anymore, CNN (Apr. 7, 1997), http://www.cnn.
comIALLPOLITICS/1997/04/07/time/hmo.html (describing the various political and popu-
lar responses at that time).
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emergencies." In the face of this widespread disapproval, the
managed care industry generally began to remove the require-
ment for pre-authorization of emergency department visits from
its contracts and also allowed members to seek care at the closest
hospital, rather than continuing to require patients to find an
emergency department that had a contract with their particular
insurer.96 However, the insurers retained the right to find the
emergency department visit medically unnecessary and thus not
reimburse the insured, resulting in a financially catastrophic
problem for patients. In response to this problem, many states
enacted "prudent layperson" laws.97 While the details of these
laws varied, they all generally required managed care plans to be
subject to state regulation requiring insurers to judge the medical
necessity of emergency department visits from the perspective of
a prudent layperson viewing the situation prior to the provision of
any medical care.9" Given the complexity of these laws and the fi-
nancial incentives for managed care organizations to deny cover-
age, hospitals were often left uncertain about managed care re-
imbursement for emergency care and always left unclear about
reimbursement for post-stabilization hospital stays that occurred
when a patient was admitted after the stabilization that is re-
quired under EMTALA.99
From a hospital's perspective, unreimbursed care was a com-
plex and frightening problem with financial consequences as wor-
risome as those attached to EMTALA violations. Particularly dur-
ing this first phase of managed care, many in-network doctors
and facilities had contracts with managed care companies that fi-
nancially penalized healthcare providers for giving patients care
that cost more than a fairly low contractually stipulated cost
95. A proposed federal Patient's Bill of Rights introduced in both the Senate and the
House of Representatives included this prohibition. S. 1890, 105th Cong. § 101(a)(1)(A)
(1980); H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 101(a)(1)(A) (1998).
96. Interesting and frank discussions of this dynamic can be found in managed care
trade journals from that time. See, e.g., Steve Heimoff, Will Prudent Layperson Please Re-
port to the ER, MANAGED CARE (1999), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9905/99
05.prudent.html.
97. Lee, supra note 93, at 164 & nn.136 & 137. With the passage of the Affordable
Care Act in 2010, this general standard now applies to all health plans in the United
States. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19a(b) (2012).
98. Lee, supra note 93, at 164 & nn.136 & 137.
99. Id.
20161
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
point.'0 Furthermore, as is true today, care that was already pro-
vided and was then denied coverage by a third-party payer was
far less likely to be paid for, since most people could not afford the
out-of-pocket costs of the care they were receiving."'
Hospitals were rapidly thrust into a position of being forced to
justify decisions to admit patients, even as they were also com-
pelled by EMTALA to stabilize all patients presented to their
emergency departments.2 If a patient seemed too ill to send
home but had no clear diagnosis of a quality or certainty that
would satisfy a cost-conscious third-party payer in terms of justi-
100. The most common form of financial penalty was through capitation agreements,
which was a method of shifting insurable risk from the insurance company to the
healthcare provider. Zuvekas & Cohen, supra note 90, at 1661. For example, a primary
care provider might be paid a fixed amount per month for each patient who chooses them
as the primary care doctor. Id. In exchange for this payment, the physician contracts to
provide all of the primary care and, perhaps, to bear financial responsibility for a subset of
all specialty care that the patient requires. Id. at 1662. Currently, most states limit these
contracts so that physicians are limited in the risk they can take on in these contracts. Id.
In the 1990s, however, it was not unusual for a physician to take on the risk for all possi-
ble care a patient required, including hospitalization and oncology treatments. Id. Not
surprisingly, many doctors were quickly facing bankruptcy under these contracts and pa-
tient care became fragmented. See, e.g., Ed Egger, System Losses, Poor Capitation Profita-
bility, Bankruptcy Warnings Signal Distress for Docs, 17 HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MGMT.
10, 10 (1999) (describing the increasing financial burden on doctors and hospitals and how
capitation agreements were becoming non-profitable). State insurance commissioners
eventually responded to this with regulation because, by entering into these contracts, in-
surance companies were contractually shifting their actuarial risk to undercapitalized and
unprepared physicians, thus evading the careful regulations of insurance companies that
the states had devised. See Lee, supra note 93, at 146.
101. It is difficult to track the precise impact of managed care reimbursement denials
on hospitals, but evidence showing a connection between managed care reimbursement
rates and hospital closings from that time make it clear that hospitals would be rational in
being concerned about the problem. See Renee Y. Hsia, Arthur L. Kellermann & Yu-Chu
Shen, Factors Associated with Closures of Emergency Departments in the United States,
305 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1978, 1978 (2011). From 1990 to 2009, 27% of all emergency de-
partments in the United States closed and a careful analysis of those that closed versus
those that remained open show that a low profit margin is associated with a significant
increased risk of closure. Id. at 1984. Furthermore, a study of hospital closings in Califor-
nia from 1995 to 2000 found that "[m]anaged care, technological developments, capitation
and competition combine to push some hospitals out of business." NICHOLAS C. PETRIS
CTR. ON HEALTH CARE MKTS. AND CONSUMER WELFARE, CALIFORNIA'S CLOSED HOSPITALS,
1995-2000 13, (2001) http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/non
profithosp/report.pdf. There is a clear connection between managed care reimbursements
and hospital survival. Anecdotal evidence from that time period seems to show, if not ac-
tual hospital failures due to managed care reimbursement denials, a belief that this can
occur. See, e.g., Maureen Glabman, Managed Care Makes It Tough for Some Hospitals to
Stay Afloat, MANAGED CARE (June 2003), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/03
06/0306.er.html.
102. See Glabman, supra note 101.
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fying a hospital admission, the emergency department was left in
a complicated position.' One possible response would be to leave
the patient in the emergency department for as long as it took to
determine if admission was medically required. But at the same
time, emergency departments were grappling with crowding due
to the steady increase of patients seeking care, making it difficult
to simply warehouse patients for any extensive period of time.10
In an effort to handle these problems, some emergency de-
partments began to set aside beds in designated observation
units.' These fairly small units, called Emergency Department
Observation Units ("EDOUs"), were located within the emergency
department but somewhat separated, and the patients were pri-
marily cared for by emergency department nurses.0 6 Academic
physicians quickly noticed that patients did extremely well in
these observation units, and there has been a steady stream of
literature showing their benefits, particularly for patients exhib-
iting cardiac problems such as chest pain.0 7 These observation
units are often thrust into the discussion of observation status as
though they were the same thing, but they are distinct creatures.
Observation status does not require a patient to be in an observa-
tion unit but is, instead, a payment status that simply reimburses
a hospital at a lesser rate than would occur were the patient to be
103. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND LABOR ACT: SURVEY OF HOSPITAL EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENTS 3 (2001), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-98-00220.pdf (reporting
that managed care reimbursement policies "leave many hospitals with a tough choice: risk
an EMTALA violation or forgo reimbursement"); Baugh, Venkatesh & Bohan, supra note
49, at 30 ("The growth of EDOUs over the past four decades has been fueled by the
acknowledgement hat emergency physicians should no longer be forced into a dichoto-
mous discharge to home or inpatient admission decision ... 
104. Olson, supra note 58, at 465.
105. See Hoot & Aronsky, supra note 18, at 131 (identifying observation units as a
commonly studied solution to crowding in emergency departments).
106. Baugh, Venkatesh & Bohan, supra note 49, at 29 ("Logistically, the EDOU is usu-
ally a discrete unit with 4 to 20 beds contained within or adjacent to the ED."); Mark G.
Moseley, Miles P. Hawley & Jeffrey M. Caterino, Emergency Department Observation
Units and the Older Patient, 29 CLINICAL GERIATRIC MED. 1, 2 (2013), http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3810312/ ("In the majority of cases observation units are
under the discretion and clinical responsibility of the ED.").
107. See Michael E. Farkouh et al., A Clinical Trial of a Chest-Pain Observation Unit
for Patients with Unstable Angina, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1882, 1882 (1998). But see Ed-
ward 0. McFalls, Letter to the Editor, Chest-Pain Observation Units, 340 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1596, 1596 (1999) (arguing that chest-pain observation units are not the safest ap-
proach for patients).
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classified as a hospital admission.' One cannot credit observa-
tion status with having the same proven benefit to patients as ob-
servation units. A patient in observation status can be in any bed
in the hospital.'9 The promise of these units may have been over-
looked due to the distraction caused by the continual problems
that observation status has presented to both hospitals and Medi-
care. Indeed, rarely do patients in observation status see the in-
side of a dedicated observation unit. While the data is unclear,
available reports show that between 19% 10 and 33%"' of hospitals
currently have a designated observation unit in the emergency
department.
D. The Development of Physician and Hospital Reimbursement
for Observation Status
When Medicare was first created in 1965, coverage was divided
into two types: Part A for hospital care".2 and Part B for physician
services provided outside of hospitals."3 At that time, there was
no concept of observation care with regards to hospital reim-
bursement."' If a patient went to the hospital and was admitted,
even if it were for some form of observation, the hospital was re-
imbursed under Part A."' At the same time, emergency depart-
ments did use observation unit beds to monitor patients who were
108. See Michelle Andrews, Observation Units May Ease Burdens of ER Care, but Bene-
fits to Patients Come at a Price, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.washington post.
com/national/health-science/observation-units-may-ease-burdens-of-er-care-but-benefits-to
-patients-come-at-a-price/2013/02/08/84ddf37e-706d- 11e2-a050-b83a7b35c4b5 story.html
(noting that insurers treat observation services as outpatient care, and highlighting the
discrepancies between coverage for outpatient and inpatient care).
109. Id.
110. Moseley, Hawley & Caterino, supra note 106, at 2 (identifying "34% of hospitals
have an observation unit, 56% of which are classified as EDOUs").
111. Jennifer L. Wiler, Michael A. Ross & Adit A. Ginde, National Study of Emergency
Department Observation Services, 18 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 959, 960 (2011), http://on
linelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j. 1553-2712.2011.01151.x/epdf; see also Andrews, supra
note 108.
112. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1811, 79 Stat. 286, 291
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012)).
113. See id. § 1831, 79 Stat. at 301 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2012)).
114. Letter from Elise Smith, Senior Vice President, Fin. Policy and Legal Affairs, Am.
Health Care Ass'n, to Marilyn Tavenner, Acting Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid
Servs. (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.ahcancal.org/facility operations/medicare[Documents/
AHICA%20Comment%20Letter%20on%200bservation%2OStays.pdf.
115. See id. (noting that the term "inpatient," as applied in 1965, included every pa-
tient not receiving emergency care).
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likely to be in the emergency department for longer than four to
six hours, usually for conditions such as suspected appendicitis."6
If the patient was not subsequently admitted, this would be cov-
ered under Part B, as an outpatient service. 7 The payment
method in both cases was a traditional fee-for-service model."'
By the late 1980s, the dynamics within emergency depart-
ments was rapidly changing, but observation of unstable patients
was still required in many cases. Studies consistently showed
that the best place for observation was in the emergency depart-
ment using an observation unit. ' In fact, in 1988, as numerous
studies continued to show the efficacy of observation units at-
tached to emergency departments, the American College of
Emergency Physicians recognized and formalized the role of ob-
servation units connected to emergency departments by publish-
ing Observation Unit Guidelines.2 °
Changes to reimbursement methods that did not take into ac-
count the need to observe unstable patients led to some chaos. Af-
ter the implementation of PPS and the increased role of managed
care gatekeeping, it was an increasingly complex undertaking to
admit patients to the hospital for observation since these patients
did not usually have a diagnosis that would justify the admission.
The need to prospectively justify the admission could make the
whole method of differential diagnosis difficult to complete.
The warehousing of patients in emergency department hall-
ways was caused not only by third-party payer reluctance to ap-
prove hospital admissions, but also by EMTALA. For patients
who came to the emergency department, EMTALA required a
certain level of care to be provided, that is, that the patient be
stabilized.12' Observation status floats in a precarious limbo in re-
lation to EMTALA precisely because observation is often called
for when it is unclear whether the patient is stable. In other
words, observation is sometimes necessary in order to identify
whether a hospital would be violating EMTALA by releasing or
116. Baugh, Venkatesh & Bohan, supra note 49, at 29.
117. See Polzin, supra note 25, at 156 ("At first, observational stays were included gen-
erally as a type of outpatient service.").
118. See id. at 151.
119. See Baugh, Venkatesh & Bohan, supra note 49, at 29.
120. Id. at 29-30.
121. Scaduto, supra note 76, at 950.
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transferring a particular patient. Adding these patients to an al-
ready over-crowded department added to emergency department
gridlock.
E. Increased CMS Focus on Unnecessary Hospital Admissions
Leaving aside managed care payers and focusing on Medicare,
patients who had DRGs that would allow payment for hospital
admissions were, of course, admitted to the hospital. Given the
bundled nature of the payment, the hospital had a financial in-
centive to treat and release those patients as quickly as possible.
After the introduction of PPS in the mid-1980s, the number of
very short hospital stays began to increase. While a certain per-
centage of patients have always had short hospital stays, between
1990 and 1997, the number who were in the hospital for only one
day prior to discharge increased by 57%.122 In August 2000, Medi-
care implemented a bundled payment system for outpatient care
called Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System
("HOPPS"). 2 This payment system, using Ambulatory Payment
Classifications ("APC"), was similar to PPS. It initially folded ob-
servation care into a more general emergency department pay-
ment."' This created a strong financial incentive for hospitals to
admit patients who were covered by Medicare and needed obser-
vation because there was no other way for hospitals to be paid for
the observation care they were providing.125 By 2002, 10% of all
Medicare patients admitted to the hospital were released the next
day.2 s This incentive structure was, in turn, quickly rectified at
least partly by a new rule allowing (or restoring) emergency de-
partment billing for observation status for patients who had chest
pain, asthma, and congestive heart failure.
27
122. Linda A. Baumann, One Day Stays: The OIG's Next National Project?, AHLA
SEMINAR MATERIALS (2002), http://archive.healthlawyers.org/google/health law archive/
program-papers/2002 MMI%5B2002_MM%5D%200NE%20DAY%2OSTAYS-%20THE%20
OIG's%20NEXT/o20NATIONAL%20PROJECT.pdf ("[T]he number of one-day inpatient
hospital discharges, as a percentage of total discharges increased 57% from 1990 to 1997;
from 6.8 to 10.7 percent.").
123. See Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System for Hospital Outpatient Ser-
vices; Delay of Effective Date, 65 Fed. Reg. 40,535 (June 30, 2000).
124. Baumann, supra note 122.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment Sys-
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Interestingly, while the 2002 CMS regulation that allowed
payment for observation care is evidence of CMS recognizing the
usefulness of observation, the new coverage policy did not require
that patients be kept in observation units connected to emergency
departments, which is what the research had focused on.2' In-
stead, CMS created observation status, a strange middle reim-
bursement level for hospitals, where patients could be treated in
any area of the hospital while being covered under Medicare Part
B as outpatients.
129
The initial CMS coverage for observation care was limited to
three conditions: chest pain, asthma, and congestive heart failure.
This is particularly interesting because, although the three condi-
tions chosen for coverage had been repeatedly shown to do well in
EDOUs, there was no specific evidence as to patients with these
conditions gaining any benefit from being under observation in
traditional hospital wards. This was a missed opportunity for
CMS to more pointedly encourage the development of observation
units. Under the current rules, two Medicare beneficiaries could
lie side by side in hospital beds, treated by the same nurses and
doctors, and one would be covered under Medicare Part A and the
other under Medicare Part B, with very different financial results
for the hospital, the patients, and Medicare.
II. THE RAC: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU INTRODUCE BOUNTY-
INCENTIVIZED CLAIMS AUDITING TO HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS?
It is fair to say that, beginning in 2002, the specter of unneces-
sary hospital admissions caused great concern for CMS." ° The
sudden and large increase in patients with short-term admissions
following CMS's attempt to create incentive structures to reduce
hospital costs in turn caused CMS to have grave suspicions of the
veracity of hospital billing processes. This suspicion appears to
have led to CMS accepting more confrontational methods for re-
ducing admissions while at the same time seeking to ensure, by
the language in the regulations, that patients who needed to be
admitted would receive the necessary care.
tern for Calendar Year 2002, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,856, 59,879 (Nov. 30, 2001).
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See Baumann, supra note 122.
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CMS's suspicions may not have been based on a clear picture of
the dynamics within hospitals at that time. A more reasoned as-
sessment, with the benefits of hindsight, shows hospitals and
emergency departments to be somewhat less blameworthy. Con-
sider again the hospital and emergency department from the ear-
ly 1980s up to 2002. While the healthcare system played a signifi-
cant role in creating and sustaining out-of-control inflation of
healthcare spending, other changes were probably equally as re-
sponsible.' Throughout this time, the system saw an increase in
people living with chronic conditions that led to more patients
with far more complex problems than had been seen in emergen-
cy departments before, a shift that is accepted as commonplace
today but was straining resources at the time.3 2 Many of these
people, in turn, had Medicare coverage."' The cost of employer-
sponsored health insurance skyrocketed in the 1980s. For exam-
ple, when costs of employer insurance increased by 23.5% be-
tween March 1982 and March 1983,134 this led to a steady reduc-
tion in individuals with health insurance so that, as a study on
this issue conducted by the Center for Disease Control in 2009
concluded, "[t]he percentage of persons under age 65 years with
private coverage remained stable from 1968 to 1980 and then de-
clined from 1980 to 2007." 1"5 People who did not have access to
health care because they did not have health insurance turned to
the emergency departments, which had to stabilize them under
EMTALA.
131. Albert E. Schwenk, Trends in Health Insurance Costs, COMPENSATION & WORKING
CONDITIONS 31, 32 (1996), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/trends-in-health-insurance-
costs.pdf.
132. Kenneth E. Thorpe & David H. Howard, The Rise in Spending Among Medicare
Beneficiaries: The Role of Chronic Disease Prevalence and Changes in Treatment Intensity,
25 HEALTH AFF. 378, 385-86 (2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/5/w378.
full.html.
133. Id. at 385.
134. Schwenk, supra note 131, at 31.
135. Cohen et al., supra note 55, at 4. The discussion that follows this statement is il-
luminating and worth including here:
During 1968-1980, the percentage of persons under age 65 years who had
private coverage remained stable at about 79%, while the number with pri-
vate coverage increased from 140.5 million to 154.1 million persons .... Dur-
ing 1980-2007, the percentage with private coverage declined steadi-
ly... [flrom 1999 to 2007, the percentage of persons under age 65 with any
private coverage declined at an average rate of more than 1% per year, to
67% in 2007 .... The downward trend in private coverage was driven in
large part by a decline in employer-sponsored coverage. In 2007, 62% of per-
sons reported employer-sponsored coverage, down from 71% in 1980.
[Vol. 50:557
REFORMING HEALTHCARE REFORM
At the same time, the methods available to control costs under
the Medicare program are distinctly limited by its enabling act,
thus limiting its ability to respond to complex scenarios as imagi-
natively as it might in an ideal scenario. First, Medicare is bound
by the terms of the Medicare Act, which puts strict limits on its
capacity to bargain.'36 Second, it is merely a payer, as opposed to
either a healthcare provider or an owner of organizations that
provide health care. Third, Medicare is an entitlement, meaning
all beneficiaries have a legal right to have the Medicare system
pay for Medicare's share of the health care to which they are enti-
tled. It cannot simply go broke or cut back on what is promised.137
The shift to bundled payments based on diagnosis codes could on-
ly be accomplished through an act of Congress amending the
Medicare Act.
The introduction of both DRG-based payment and APC-based
payment was for the purpose of creating a financial incentive
structure for physicians and hospitals, in an effort by CMS to
drive providers' decision making in specific directions. ' It should
not have been a surprise to the federal government that the re-
sponses to the incentive structures distorted behavior in ways
that were neither foreseen nor beneficial to Medicare. However,
the shift in payment methods and CMS's subsequent struggle to
prevent healthcare providers from increasing the severity of pa-
tient diagnosis (upcoding) and ordering unnecessary hospital ad-
missions has led to a strange, chaotic exercise in legislative and
regulatory whack-a-mole resulting in the federal government
seemingly ignoring the truly difficult challenge of running a mod-
ern emergency department and viewing doctors and hospitals as,
if not the enemy, certainly not colleagues in the same undertak-
ing.
136. Fox, supra note 51, at 5.
137. This is not meant to imply that Medicare is not a creature of statute. Were Con-
gress and the President to amend or repeal Medicare, it would, of course, be changed. Ab-
sent this type of activity, CMS and its predecessor agencies have limited avenues for
achieving cost control.
138. See Baumann, supra note 122.
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A. Modern Regulatory Efforts to Differentiate Between
Observation and Admission Status
Before 2002, CMS recognized that there was a problem with
overuse of hospital admissions.' The CMS manuals, which gov-
erned both when admission and outpatient care-including ob-
servation-were appropriate, were vague.' The language was ex-
tremely circular."' Much was left to the doctor's discretion,
though it was important that she chart the appropriate analytic
steps in her decision-making process.'4 2 A particular area of con-
fusion was the effect of the length of stay on Medicare coverage.
In general, observation care was meant to be short, somewhere
between eight and twenty-four hours, whereas admissions could
be contemplated for hospital stays that were anticipated to be
longer than twenty-four hours. However, while this was implied
in coverage manuals, there was also language clarifying that
these were not binding rules governing the appropriate level of
143care.
In 2000, the Health and Human Services ("HHS") Office of the
Inspector General ("OIG") began to formally identify and investi-
gate hospitals with a pattern of billing Medicare for admissions of
less than one day.'44 The OIG believed that hospitals were manip-
ulating the billing process and sought to prove that many of the
139. See generally id. (discussing the OIG's investigation of "one-day hospital stays"
and the abuse of hospital admissions).
140. For inpatient admissions, see Medicare Intermediary Manual, HCFA-Pub. 13
([MIM]) § 3101; Hospital Manual, HCFA-Pub. 10 ([HM]) § 210. For outpatient observation
care, see MIM, § 3112.8; HM § 230.6.
141. "Th[e] definition of 'inpatient' is maddeningly circular-it provides that an 'inpa-
tient' is one who has been admitted for purposes of receiving 'inpatient hospital services'
and provides further that a person is 'generally' 'considered an inpatient' if he has been
'formally admitted as an inpatient."' Health Care Compliance Adviser, OIG Focus on One-
Day Inpatients and Combined Admissions, JONES DAY 1, 1 [hereinafter Healthcare Com-
pliance Adviser], http://www.jonesday.com/oig-fo cus-on-one-day-inpatients-and-combined-
admissions- 11-11-2002/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
142. See Baumann, supra note 122.
143. See id.
144. JUNE GIBBS BROWN, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GEN., WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2000 1 (2000), http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/work
plan2000/workpl.pdf. For a discussion of this process, see Healthcare Compliance Adviser,
supra note 141, at 1-2. The OIG did not designate this as a "national project" but included
it in its work plan. Id. at 1. Contemporary discussions about this development seem to
have occurred primarily in health law practitioner journals of that time.
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short admissions were, in effect, Medicare fraud.4' Working with
the Justice Department, the OIG was successful in reaching a
settlement under the False Claims Act against a handful of hos-
pitals in New Jersey.146 The OIG was also investigating hospitals
in a number of other states and sought to spread the investiga-
tions across the country. '47 The focus on short hospital stays was
arguably a sensible one since those short stays were often retro-
actively found to have not required hospital admission. But many
hospital administrators felt it was unfairly punitive since it was
often difficult to know prior to admission what the patient prog-
nosis was.
To further complicate matters, Medicare had a system whereby
it reviewed claims, often retrospectively, using private insurance
companies known as Medicare Administrative Contractors
("MACs") to process claims.4 ' These companies imposed bright-
line rules regarding length of hospital stays so that, even though
the Medicare manuals specifically did not commit to requiring
hospital admissions to be for longer than twenty-four hours,
claims were being denied in some areas of the country based on
this reasoning.'49 At first, HHS OIG audits involved a statistical
approach.'° If the rough numbers of a hospital's admissions histo-
ry implied a pattern, fines were applied with limited or no ap-
peals process to seek recourse for errors."' It was eventually
widely recognized as an imprecise process that often led to unfair
and incorrect results.'52 In the rare cases where actual audits
were conducted, they were paper-based, took an extraordinary
amount of time, and were cumbersome for the providers.'53 These
audits often showed how imprecise the statistical assumptions
were. The main focus of the statistical audits was on admissions
that lasted less than twenty-four hours, even though CMS rules
145. Healthcare Compliance Adviser, supra note 141, at 1-2.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1 (2012).
149. Healthcare Compliance Adviser, supra note 141, at 2.
150. Id. at 1-2.
151. See id. at 2 (discussing recommended actions hospitals can take to defend them-
selves during an OIG fraud investigation).
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id.
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did not in fact prohibit them.14 Other admissions were only sub-
ject to scrutiny in the paper-based audits.
B. The RAC: A CMS Program That Exacerbated Problems with
Observation Status
In 2003, CMS found that the limited auditing it was doing re-
vealed errors in Medicare billing at a rate between 6% and 10%
and that the program was inappropriately paying out billions of
dollars a year.116 In the same year, in an effort to control this
problem, Congress directed CMS to begin a three-year pilot pro-
gram of auditing all Medicare billing."7 In an effort to have pre-
cise and accurate determinations about whether admissions com-
plied with the rules governing coverage, this pilot program
planned to utilize private contractors whose audits would be fi-
nanced through a bounty system.5 8 The audits would cover all ac-
tual claims submitted for Medicare reimbursement in two
states." Given the sheer number of claims, the system promised
to be highly labor intensive.
The idea to use private contractors who worked for bounties
was highly attractive for a number of reasons. First, under the
terms of the agreements with the private companies, the auditors
would be tasked with finding over- and under-billing problems,
60
a pleasantly neutral sounding proposition. In truth, however, the
incentive structure tilted towards finding overpayments as the
auditors would only be "compensat[ed] ... through retention of a
percentage of the overpayment recoveries.,'16' The auditors would
be empowered to directly recover the overpayments,6' but could
154. Id. at 1-2.
155. See id. at 2-3.
156. Medicare Learning Network, MMA-The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) Recovery Audit Contract (RAC) Initiative, MLN MAWrERS 1 (Mar. 29, 2013)
[hereinafter MLN MATTERS], https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-EducationMedicare-Lea
rning-Network-MLNMLNMattersArtices/downloads/se0469.pdf.
157. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 306, 117 Stat. 2066, 2256.
158. Id. § 306(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 2256.
159. Id. § 306(b), 117 Stat. at 2256.
160. Id. § 306(a), 117 Stat. at 2256.
161. MLN MATTERS, supra note 156, at 2.
162. Including having the ability to charge interest to hospitals for any overpayments
not refunded within thirty days of notification. Id.
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only refer underpayment problems to the original Medicare
claims processor."' Second, at that time, it was politically attrac-
tive to use non-government private contractors to handle histori-
cally governmental tasks.'64 This was not limited to health care.
For example, the ongoing war in Iraq at the time utilized private
contractors to an unprecedented egree.'5 Third, the use of what
are in effect bounty payments as the sole source of funding al-
lowed for the creation of a labor-intensive audit process without
significant federal spending.'66 This third reason is premised on
the auditors finding significantly more over-billing than under-
billing, which has been the pattern.
167
Through the pilot program, CMS selected the RACs."6 ' The
RAC demonstration was designed to perform audits of billing af-
ter all other CMS cost-control provisions had been applied.'69 To
do that, the RACs had to wait a minimum of one year after all
regular payment processes had been completed.'7 ° When the pro-
gram initially began, RACs could audit claims up to four years
old, but this was subsequently changed to three years midway
through the pilot program.7 ' In order to thoroughly audit hospital
claims, the RACs were given the power to request all claims in-
formation from MACs, the regional companies that handled the
claims processing for the Medicare program.'72 RACs could also
163. Id.
164. See Marsha Gold, Private Plans in Medicare: Another Look, MKT. WATCH 1302,
1302 (2005).
165. For a contemporary study of the use of private contractors during the United
States war in Iraq during this time, see Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing War, BROOKINGS
INST. (2005), http://www.brookings.edu/researchlarticles/2005/03/Olusdepartmentofdefen
se-singer.
166. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 306(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2066, 2256.
167. This article uses the phrase "bounty" purposefully. Recent scholarship by Nicholas
R. Parrillo examines the rejection of government-sanctioned bounty hunting in the United
States due to negative experiences with it. In his book, Against the Profit Motive, he gives
numerous examples of these problems in a time spanning 1780 to 1940. The book effective-
ly savages the use of such programs, and the RAC fits squarely within his definition. See
NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (2013).
168. THE MEDICARE RECOVERY AUDIT CONTRACTOR (RAC) PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION
OF THE 3-YEAR DEMONSTRATION 7 (2008) [hereinafter RAC DEMONSTRATION], http://yale
press.yale.edu/book.asp?isbn=9780300176582.
169. See id. at 11.
170. MLN MATTERS, supra note 156, at 2.
171. See RAC DEMONSTRATION, supra note 168, at 3.
172. See id. at 1; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID, RECOVERY AUDITING IN MEDICARE
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request patient files from the providers. 17 In the pilot program, if
overpayments were found, healthcare providers were entitled to
appeal the finding to the MACs.'
74
The multi-year window for reviewing claims created substan-
175tial financial risk for healthcare providers in the pilot program.
Prior to the implementation of the RAC program, Medicare had a
legal obligation to pay claims in a timely manner.7 1 While fraud
investigations could result in those payments being recovered,
generally, Medicare could assure hospitals of payment within
thirty days of patient care being provided. 'After RAC program
implementation, these payments could be recovered years after
they had been paid.'
78
The pilot program quickly made money for CMS.'79 Over the
two-and-one-half year pilot, RACs recovered over $1 billion.1
8
0
Most impressively, after a relatively slow start during the months
after implementation, with only 4% of the final reimbursement
dollars being collected in 2006, 62% of the money was collected in
the first six months of 2008.1 During this pilot program, 14% of
RAC determinations of overbilling were appealed to the MACs
and one-third of those appeals were successful.'8 2 The RACs were
required to reimburse CMS for any bounties that had been paid
on the determinations that were overturned on the first level of
appeal.'83 Finally, CMS found that the RACs earned one dollar for
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at v (2014), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems[Monitoring-ProgramsMedicare-FFS-Compliance-ProgramsRecovery-Audit-Progr
am/Downloads/FY-2013-Report-To-Congress.pdf.
173. See RAC DEMONSTRATION, supra note 168, at 12.
174. See MLN MATTERS, supra note 156, at 2.
175. See RAC DEMONSTRATION, supra note 168, at 20, 25.
176. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING
MANUAL § 30.3.12 (2015), https://www.cms.govfRegulations-and-Guidance/GuidancefMan
ualsfDownloads/clm 104c01.pdf.
177. See id. at § 80.2.1.1.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(1)(A) (2012).
179. See RAC DEMONSTRATION, supra note 168, at 2.
180. See id. at 2, 15.
181. See id. at 2, 34.
182. See id. at 2, 20.
183. See id. at 20.
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CMS for every twenty cents that was spent, making it extremely
cost-effective."s4
C. The National Expansion of the RAC Program
In light of the cost savings that the federal government almost
immediately realized, coupled with the revenue-neutral financing
mechanism for the program (i.e., the contractors were paid
through bounties rather than tax revenue), the pilot program did
not go for the full three years before it was expanded nationally. 185
Congress passed a law expanding the RAC program in 2006 for
implementation by 2010.186 Since the beginning of the pilot pro-
gram, the RAC concept has not been substantially altered in
terms of its goals or financing mechanism."7 The pilot program
and expansion were created during a Republican presidential
administration and a Democrat-controlled Congress, and main-
tained and expanded during a Democrat presidential administra-
tion and a Republican-controlled Congress.' s It is fair to say that
this program is not a partisan political issue, making it an ideal
pilot program to examine. In 2013, the RAC program recovered
almost $4 billion, resulting in returns of over $3 billion to the
Medicare program."9 From a financial perspective, the expansion
of the program has been a success for CMS.
184. See id. at 3.
185. See id. at 54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(h)(1)(B)(3) (2012).
186. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 302, 120 Stat.
2922, 2991-92 (codified at 42. U.S.C. § 1395ddd (2012)).
187. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd (2012) (explaining the Medicare Integrity Program,
and in order to recover overpayments, the Secretary shall enter into a plan with the
provider for the purposes of repayment), and MLN MATTERS, supra note 156, at 2
(providing details about the RACs pilot program and mentioning that the collection
policies to be applied will be the same as those currently in effect), with Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub L. No. 108-173,
§ 306, 117 Stat. 2256 (explaining a demonstration project to explore the use of RACs to
recoup overpayments under the Medicare Integrity Program).
188. Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the United States, ABOUT.COM AMERICAN
HISTORY, http://americanhistory.about.comlibrary/charts/lbchartpresidents.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 1, 2015); Visual Guide: The Balance of Power Between Congress and the Presi-
dency (1945-2015), WIREDPEN, http://wiredpen.com/resources/political-commentary-and-
analysis/a-visual-guide-balance-of-power-congress-presidency/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
189. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., RECOVERING AUDITING IN MEDICARE
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This article focuses primarily on Medicare Parts A and B, par-
ticularly the auditing of hospitals' admissions and observation
stays, which have been particularly problematic. However, the
problems with the RAC program are far more widespread than
this one example. Currently, including the expansion of the pro-
gram that was included in the Affordable Care Act, 9 ' the bounty-
based audit program covers all Medicare components, including
Medicare Parts A, B, C, and D. 19" Furthermore, the states must
use RACs for Medicaid.'92 The current audit program has consid-
erable breadth.'
93
During the initial phase of the expansion and up until very re-
cently, the RACs have been fairly similar to what they were in
the initial pilot program. The RACs audit Medicare admission
claims to determine if incorrect coding was used for patient
care.91 If they find an incorrect coding, the amount paid to the
hospital or physician is corrected according to the RAC finding. '
The RAC auditors are still paid by a bounty system.9 ' They are
190. Expansion of the Recovery Audit Contractor (RAC) Program, Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6411, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
191. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Parts C and D Recovery Audit Program,
CMS.GOV (May 22, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Monitoring-Programsrecovery-audit-program-parts-c-and-d/ (discussing the RAC pro-
gram's implementation for Medicare parts A, B, C, and D).
192. Id.
193. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOVERY
AUDITING AT THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & Medicaid SERVICES: FY 2010 REPORT TO
CONGRESS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 6411 OF AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, at iii, v (2011), https:
//www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/recovery-aud
it-program/downloads/fy2l0reportcongress.pdf. The CMS proposed regulations of July 1,
2015 do alter the program's reach, in that it would no longer perform audits of observation
of admission claims. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fact Sheet: Two-Midnight Rule,
CMS.GOV (July 1, 2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: Two-Midnight Rule], https://www.cms.
gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-07-01.2.
html.
194. RAC DEMONSTRATION, supra note 168, at 1.
195. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE
RECOVERY AUDIT PROGRAM MYTHS 1-3 (2012), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-
data-and-systems/monitoring-prgramsrecovery-audit-program/downloads/rac-program.
myths-12-18-12.pdf; Frequently Asked Questions about Medicare Recovery Audit Contrac-
tors (RACs), MED. GRP. MGMT. ASS'N, http://www.mgma.com/government-affairs/issues-
overview/compliance/racs-recovery-audit-contractors/faqs-about-racs (last visited Dec. 1,
2015).
196. AM. HOSP. ASS'N, FACTS ABOUT THE MEDICARE AUDIT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2013
(H.R. 1250/S. 1012) (2014).
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also meant to identify common errors in billing to facilitate sys-
tem improvement and communicate the common errors to both
the provider and CMS."7
There are now two levels of appeal conducted through the su-
pervision of the MAC for medical service providers who have been
found to be in error by a RAC. After these appeals have been ex-
hausted, an appellant has recourse to a hearing before an Admin-
istrative Law Judge ("ALJ")." This decision can, in turn, be ap-
pealed to a Medicare panel and, finally, to a federal district
court.199
Even though the appeals process is cumbersome and time con-
suming for appellants, enough appeals have proceeded to expose
significant rates of error in the RAC system. According to data re-
leased by CMS, on average, since the program became national in
2010, a minimum of 50% of third-level appeals before an ALJ
from hospitals challenging a denial have been found entirely in
favor of the hospital.° The American Hospital Association col-
lects data regarding RAC audits from their members. According
to their statistics, hospitals appeal 44% of all RAC denials."0 ' Of
appeals that have been through the process, 73% have been over-
turned at some level.0 2 However, due to the backlog of appeals,
which have yet to be heard and have quickly accumulated since
the RAC program was expanded in 2010, 44% of all appeals are
still awaiting resolution.0 2 Looked at in the light most favorable
for RACs, given the extraordinary number of claims audited by
RACs, some error is likely, and appeals allow for a process where
legitimate concerns can be heard and responded to. However, the
197. See Recovery Audit Program, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-
data-and-systems/monitoring-programs/medicare-ffs-compliance-programs/recovery- audit-
program/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).




200. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., IMPROVEMENTS ARE
NEEDED AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE LEVEL OF MEDICARE APPEALS 9 (2012), http:
//oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-02-10-00340.pdf.
201. AM. Hose. ASS'N, EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF THE RAC PROGRAM ON HOSPITALS





UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
true success rates of appeals are unclear. The backlog of appeals
before ALJs has reached over one million, with wait times esti-
mated at 541 days for appeals filed in 2015.204
D. The Medical Community and the RAC
The perspective from the medical community is quite different
from that of CMS. It is fair to generalize that, from the hospital
perspective, RACs have been a mess. For hospitals, the program
has been extremely costly, time consuming, and frightening. Ac-
cording to American Hospital Association data, a majority of hos-
pitals spend at least $40,000 a year on managing RAC processes,
with a third of hospitals spending at least $100,000.205 The RAC
program's success has encouraged other third-party payers to be-
come increasingly aggressive with regards to challenging physi-
cian decisions to admit patients, which also adds to hospital ad-
ministrative burdens.26 Finally, the wrangling about observation
status has intruded deeply into the physician-patient relation-
ship, influencing treatment decisions in ways that can have a
negative impact on patient outcomes and patient financial sta-
tus.
207
The reason admission and observation status is a particularly
difficult area for RAC audits goes back to the continual problem
of the medical complexity inherent in determining whether a pa-
tient should be in observation status or admitted. These decisions
cannot be reduced to a simple rubric when one is faced with situ-
ations involving sick patients who do not have a clear, obviously
admission-worthy illness. The Medicare program has found it im-
possible to define these statuses with any clarity, leaving the fi-
204. Medicare Appellant Forum Recap: OMHA Overwhelmed with Appeals Backlog,
Providers Will Wait Close to 3 Years for a Hearing, HANCOCK, DANIEL, JOHNSON & NAGLE,
P.C. (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.hdjn.com/pdfs/advisories/2014/ClientAdvisory-Medicare
AppellantForumRecapOMHAOverwhelmedWithAppealsBacklog2.21.14.pdf; Adjudication
Timeframes, HHS.GOV (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/omha/important-noticeregard
ing-adjudication-timeframes.html.
205. Mark Taylor, Whacked by RAC, HH&N DAILY (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.hhn
mag.com/articles/5303-whacked-by-rac.
206. See AM. HOSP. AsS'N, HOSPITAL SURVEY REPORT: THE REAL COST OF THE
INEFFICIENT MEDICARE RAC PROGRAM, http:www.aha.org/content/15/hospsurveyreport.
pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
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nal decision up to the treating physician. After the fact, it can be
relatively easy to see whether admission was necessary, but the
initial decision has to be made with imperfect knowledge.
The absence of clarity while the decision is being made, the rel-
ative obviousness of the outcome after the fact, and the lack of
clear safe harbors in Medicare rules make short-term hospital
admissions a soft target, attracting attacks by auditors who are
paid by commission or bounty. Add to this the burdensome ap-
peals process faced by healthcare providers and one can see that
the incentives are in place for RACs to focus on challenging short
hospital admissions. The number of denials for these types of cas-
es is significant. According to data collected by the American
Hospital Association, in the third quarter of 2014, 23% of all RAC
denials were related to admission status for hospital stays of less
than forty-eight hours.0 8
There are numerous examples of problems that have arisen in
this area. Claims for hospital admissions must be submitted to
Medicare within 120 days of the patient's treatment.20 9 The RACs
audit claims long after this window has closed. For a number of
years, if the RAC determined that a patient should have been
placed in observation status rather than admission, the hospital
would be forced to return the admission payment but would be
precluded from collecting any payment for the observation care
that was provided because the claim was not properly filed within
the initial time frame.21 ° CMS is currently seeking to fix this prob-
lem, but the initial result was to put more pressure on hospitals
to shift patients from admission to observation status.21'
Risk-averse hospitals have been shifting patients from admis-
sion to observation status212 in order to avoid audit problems, and
this, in turn, has had negative financial and health outcome ef-
208. EXPLORING THE IMPACT, supra note 201, at 19.
209. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICARE APPEALS 10 (2015).
210. Ina Jaffe, For Hospital Patients, Observation Status Can Prove Costly, NPR (Sept.
4, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/09/O4/218633011/for-hospital-pati
ents-observation-status-can-prove-costly.
211. Susan Jaffe, FAQ: Hospital Observation Care Can Be Costly for Medicare Patients,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 18, 2014), http://khn.org/news/observation-care/faq/.
212. For a discussion of the increase in Medicare patients in observation, see Feng,
Wright & Mor, supra note 13.
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fects on patients.212 In a 2013 testimony before the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance, the Center for Medicare Advocacy presented
detailed data about this problem.214 In brief, if a patient receives
care under observation, the care is covered under Medicare Part
B, which provides for outpatient care.2"5 For an admission, the
care is covered under Medicare Part A, which has much more
generous benefits.2 s Under Part B, the patient must make co-
payments for every service billed, resulting in far higher out-of-
pocket payments than would be required for the exact same care
under Part A.217
Perhaps more important than reimbursement rates, many
Medicare beneficiaries require lengthy acute-skilled nursing
home treatment when they are released from the hospital, and
coverage for this depends on the patient's hospital status."' If a
patient is an admission and stays for at least three days, Medi-
care Part A covers skilled nursing home care."' On the other
hand, if the patient is in observation status, there is no coverage
under Medicare Part B for skilled nursing home care.22' The costs
for skilled nursing home care can be many thousands of dollars a
month.221 Many patients do not find out about these financial is-
sues until after their release to the skilled nursing home, leading
to numerous instances of significant financial strain.222
213. Debra Wood, Admit or Observe: Where Do We Go from Here?, AMN HEALTHCARE
(Mar. 15, 2014), https://www.amnhealthcare.comlatest-healthcare-news/admit-or-observe-
where-do-we-go-from-here/.
214. Program Integrity: Oversight of Recovery Audit Contractors: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 69-71 (2013) (statement of the Center for Medicare Advocacy,
Inc.). The challenges for patients in observation status have been discussed at length in
scholarly articles. This article recognizes that this is a significant facet of the problem with
the distinction between admission and observation status. For an in-depth examination of
this, see Parker, supra note 28.
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CARE COSTS 5 (2012), https://www.metlife.comlassets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/2012/
studies/mmi-2012-market-survey-long-term-care-costs.pdf.
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In a comment letter sent to CMS in 2012, the American
Healthcare Association did an excellent job of pointing out that
the three-day in-patient stay trigger for skilled nursing home
coverage is part of the original Medicare Act of 1965, drafted
when observation status did not exist.23 The letter asked CMS to
allow all stays in the hospital to count towards the three-day re-
quirement for skilled nursing care coverage.224 The Medicare Act,
as originally drafted, does not envision this problem, and the cur-
rent financial penalty for patients appears to have developed by
happenstance rather than coherent legislative intent. The lack of
governmental process in the development of this significant fi-
nancial burden makes it appear terribly unfair. The problem still
remains unresolved.
E. Change, Yet Again: Abandoning the RAC for Observation and
Admission Review
In 2013, CMS proposed a new regulation in an effort to clarify
observational status. This regulation, the Two Midnight Rule,
did not calm the situation, but rather seemed to have created a
flash point for the frustration experienced by various stakehold-
ers who grapple with RAC audits, patient costs, and hospital ad-
ministrative burdens.226 The rule created a presumption that pa-
tients who needed to stay in the hospital for more than forty-eight
hours should have admission status, though a physician was re-
quired to certify the medical necessity of that stay.22' The rule also
implied that stays that were shorter than forty-eight hours would
presumptively be observation stays.28 It did not sufficiently clari-
fy how hours in the hospital were to be counted. For example,
would time spent in the emergency department prior to admis-
clearly delineate when observation or admission status is appropriate. See, e.g., Find out if
You're an Inpatient or an Outpatient-It Affects What You Pay, MEDICARE.GOV, https:/!
www. medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-a/inpatient-or-outpatient.html (explaining
the different scenarios that could affect patients' benefits).
223. Letter from Elise Smith to Marilyn Tavenner, supra note 114.
224. Id.
225. Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the
Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496, 50,506 (Aug.
19, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412, 413, 414, 419, 424, 482, 485 & 489).
226. See Wood, supra note 213.
227. Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the
Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System, 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,506.
228. Id. at 50,746.
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sion count towards forty-eight hours? The rule appeared to create
the possibility that a patient could be charged for observation sta-
tus, including responsibility for skilled nursing care, while the
hospital could be reimbursed for an admission.
The uproar over the Two Midnight Rule eventually resulted in
Congress passing a law to delay its implementation.229 After pass-
ing this legislation, Congress sent a letter to CMS expressing its
concern about observation status.23° In it, more than one hundred
members of Congress state "[W]e are concerned that Medicare
beneficiaries could assume a higher financial burden for their
care under the new policy. Additionally, we are concerned that
hospitals in our districts could be undercompensated for provid-
ing medically necessary services that do not meet the new criteria
spelled out by CMS ....
In July 2015, CMS shifted its position. First, it made a clear
statement hat it intended to allow admission status when a phy-
sician believes that a patient requires a hospital stay of longer
than forty-eight hours, even if subsequent events such as patient
death, clinical improvement, or a patient leaving against medical
advice, reduce the time a patient actually spends in the hospi-
tal. 232
Second, it announced that RACs, would no longer conduct the
majority of reviews of admission and observation statuses, but ra-
ther Quality Improvement Organizations would assume this
role.233 These organizations are radically different from RACs.
They are groups made up of consumer representatives,
healthcare provider representatives, and related people.234 While
they are paid for their work, they do not receive any financial in-
centive to deny claims or to achieve any other outcome.
2 35
229. Extension of Two-Midnight Rule, Pub. L. No. 113-93, § 111, 128 Stat. 1040, 1044
(2014).
230. Letter from 109 Members of Congress Representing Both Parties, to Marilyn
Tavenner, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Sept. 24, 2013).
231. Id.
232. Fact Sheet: Two-Midnight Rule, supra note 193.
233. Id.
234. Quality Improvement Organizations, CMS.GOV (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.cms.
gov/medicare/quality-initiatives-patient-assessment-instrumentsqualityimprovementorgs
/index.html.
235. See Letter from Robert McLean, Chair, Med. Practice and Quality Comm., Am.
Coll. of Physicians, to Andy Slavitt, Acting Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.
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Finally, it clarified how it would handle patient stays that are
less than forty-eight hours and thus are not subject to a rule pre-
sumptively allowing admission.2"6 The primary determination will
be the opinion of the treating physician as to whether admission
is necessary.237 However, the determinations will be considered on
a case-by-case basis, subject to a medical necessity review (pre-
sumably conducted by the Quality Improvement Organiza-
tions).238 In particular, the rule seems to imply that stays of less
than twenty-four hours will be examined closely to see if the ad-
mission is justified.9
CMS's new policy may calm the waters troubled by the Two
Midnight Rule and-by removing RAC auditors from this area-
may lessen the adversarial tension between caregivers and Medi-
care. However, if the new regime develops its own problematic en-
forcement culture, the same problems that have plagued observa-
tion status will continue. Furthermore, the proposal does not fix
the financial problems that patients face as a result of what must
appear to them to be an arbitrary decision-making process. From
a patient perspective, two patients in beds in the same ward with
the exact same nurses and doctors can be treated very differently
from a financial perspective.
This case study began in emergency departments, and it seems
fitting to return to them in its conclusion. In 2016, how does an
emergency department respond to patients in light of the confu-
sion regarding observation status, the high stakes hospitals face,
and the need to provide a high level of care to ever increasing
numbers of increasingly sick patients?
The Pope Francis Emergency Department of Providence Hospi-
tal in Washington, D.C., graciously allowed the author of this ar-
ticle to spend a shift there in the summer of 2015.24° In order to
ensure that all patient claims are properly given observation or
admission status, the Emergency Department has two nurses
whose full-time job is to review all claims before they are submit-
(Aug. 6, 2015).




240. Interview with Various Emergency Room Doctors, Providence Hosp. in Washing-
ton, D.C. (May 11, 2015) (interview notes on file with author).
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ted in order to ensure that the status is proper. To do this, the
nurses use a series of computer programs-some provided by the
government, some provided by national organizations, and some
licensed to the hospital-that allow them to analyze the medical
records of the patients to determine which status is appropri-
ate.242 The hospital also contracts with a review organization that
gives a second read to any claims that the nurses are unsure
about.2
What was most interesting about the process for internally re-
viewing claims was how the nurses view it as an opportunity to
ensure high levels of quality in patient care. If a patient appears
to have a condition that would justify admission but the doctor
has not ordered it, the nurse will go over the medical records,
check the diagnostic procedures that were recorded in the notes,
and seek out the doctor to clarify the orders.2 4' The nurses also
consult quality checklists to see if any appropriate steps have
been skipped in a patient's care.24 ' The nurses were comfortable
asking doctors to change admission to observation status if it
seemed necessary for reimbursement.46 If the doctor agreed with
the nurse who approached her, the orders would be changed.4 7 It
was surprisingly serene when experienced against the backdrop
of the systemic tension surrounding these issues.
It is odd, when one considers the historical antecedents to the
current situation, to see how it is currently playing out. In 1965,
observation was used in emergency departments to assess pa-
tients whose prognosis was unclear.2 41 Currently, third-party pay-
ers use observation status to reduce the costs of medical care, and
the concept has become increasingly detached from its clinical
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ment system in a manner that protects their financial well-being
and improves patient care.
III. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE INCREMENTAL
HEALTHCARE REFORM
It would be helpful at this stage in healthcare reform to clarify
societal goals ground expectations within a framework that
acknowledges immutable characteristics of the system, and plan
in such a way that the developing system anticipates and nimbly
responds to the problems that will continuously arise. This is not
an impossible task, but it does require a certain degree of modes-
ty in expectations and a willingness to refrain from blame.
A. Avoiding Heightened Rhetoric, Moving Towards Reflective
Equilibrium
Currently, public discussions about healthcare reform common-
ly take two paths, neither of which is especially useful. The first,
and most colorful, is fraught with apocalyptic accusations. For
example, those opposed to healthcare reform claim that current
laws or proposals empower untrained shadow figures who, moti-
vated by nothing but evil, seek to slay the elderly and vulnera-
ble.5 This is often contrasted with a description of the current
system where loving, happy families generally enjoy health and
the best healthcare system the world has to offer."1 The rhetoric
against those who oppose healthcare reform is also extremely
heightened, often containing accusations of a cold-blooded ab-
sence of concern for those who suffer illness or pain."'
250. See, e.g., Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK
(Aug. 7, 2009, 4:26 PM), https://www.facebook.comnnotes/sarah-palin/statement-on-the-
current-health-care-debate/113851103434 ("[W]ho will suffer the most when they ration
care? The sick, the elderly, and the disabled of course .... [s]uch a system is downright
evil.").
251. See, e.g., Leigh Ann Caldwell, Boehner Defends Romney's Critique of Individual
Mandate, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/boehner-defends-rom
neys-critique-of-individual-mandate/ (stating that healthcare reform "will bankrupt our
country and ruin the best healthcare delivery system in the world").
252. For an excellent discussion of the heightened rhetoric in healthcare reform, see
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEV. L. J. 872
(2013).
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The second, less rhetorically vehement approach is still prob-
lematic. Perhaps in an effort to persuade the political system to
move in a positive direction, policy makers and politicians often
present a proposed healthcare system reform as though it will
solve once and for all serious and intractable problems.2"' Coun-
ter-proposals are presented in a similar manner. The language
focuses on what will be fixed, leaving out compromises, burdens,
and difficult choices that remain.254 In seeking to simplify political
decisions, this form of debate avoids the serious moral and struc-
tural challenges that the healthcare system is actively grappling
with on any given day and will continue to grapple with into the
foreseeable future.255
It appears that the politics of healthcare reform often devolve
into a ludicrous display, leaving those who work in healthcare
policy torn between irritation and despair. The heightened rheto-
ric used by many of those who speak about reform seems to prom-
ise perfection and destruction in equal parts.256 In response to
these promises and threats, one can imagine that those who must
interact with the healthcare system (almost everyone) grapple
with confusion, elation, and terror. These emotions are closely fol-
lowed by vague disappointment as neither their greatest hopes
253. Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010:
Reforming the Health Care Reform for the New Decade, 14 PAIN PHYSICIAN E35, E36
(2011).
254. See id.
255. For example, proponents who supported the expanded availability of health insur-
ance under the Affordable Care Act focused on access to insurance, but did not directly
address the increase in cost that would be borne by those who had previously been less
expensive to insure. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Unaffordable Health
Act-A Response to Professors Bagely and Horwitz 6 (Social Science Research Network,
2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1900964##. Young adult men
with high incomes who purchased individual insurance would see costs rise because they
would be included in a pool with young adult women, who are generally more expensive to
insure due to the cost associated with pregnancy. See Jeffrey Dorfman, The High Costs of
Obamacare Hit Home for the Middle Class, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.forbes.
comlsites/jeffreydorfman2013/10/31/the-high-costs-of-obamacare-hit-home-for-the-middle-
class/.
256. See, e.g., Thomas C. Feeney, Preserving Freedom and Federalism: What's at Stake
for Americans in the Health Care Debate, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 13, 2009), http://
www.heritage.org/researchlreports/2009/10/preserving-freedom-and-federalism-whats-at-
stake-for-americans-in-the-health-care-debate (highlighting the pursuit of perfection in
America's healthcare system); Will Obamacare Destroy Jobs?, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 21,
2013), http://www.economist.com/blogsldemocracyinamerica/2013/08/health-reform-and-e




nor fears are realized. For example, the oft-cited "miracles of
modern medicine in the United States" cannot absolutely prevent
mortality. At the same time, caregivers of the elderly quickly re-
alize that they are not fending off murderous panels of federal
bureaucrats, as some portended would occur with the passage of
the Affordable Care Act.2"7 Rather, the experience of illness in the
elderly is often a sad one, tinged with inevitability. Caregivers
are a mix of committed and distracted, resources are a mix of
scarce and plentiful, and insurance coverage is, in turn, irration-
al, burdensome, and a godsend. The high promises and grave
threats of much recent political rhetoric are detached from these
struggles. And this detachment and distance is itself the strong-
est possible condemnation of the rhetoric. If our political debates
about health care do not resonate with those who are ill or those
caring for the ill, we are not talking about what matters.
In clinical bioethics, the practice of reflective equilibrium
teaches us first to clarify areas of agreement, then to define ter-
minology carefully, and eventually focus the discussion on the
remaining areas of disagreement.258 Often what remains to disa-
gree about is somewhat small and, because the participants in
the debate recognize that they all, in truth, agree about many
ethical norms and goals, the ensuing negotiations can take place
with mutual respect and trust. This is not happening with regard
to many current political discussion about healthcare reform.
Stepping back from rhetoric, overarching societal goals about
health care are fairly easy to determine. It is likely true that the
vast majority of people would agree that the goals of the public
health system are to reduce morbidity and mortality.259 Methods
for achieving these goals can be in conflict with other goals and
values such as those related to the proper scope of government,
allocation of scarce resources, and autonomy. But it does not seem
257. See, e.g., Obamacare's Penalties on Hospital Readmissions Will Kill off the Sick
and Elderly, PATRIOT UPDATE (May 18, 2014), http://patriotupdate.com/obamacares-
penalties-hospital-readmissions-will-kill-sick-elderly (arguing that the Affordable Care
Act will result in elderly deaths).
258. For a more philosophical discussion of reflective equilibrium, see Norman Daniels,
Reflective Equilibrium, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 12, 2011), http://seop.illc.uva.ni/
entries/reflective -equilibrium].
259. See What is the Public Health System?, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http:/f
www.hhs.gov/ash/initiatives/quality/system/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (stating the mission
of the public health system is to "ensure conditions in which people can be healthy").
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extreme to assume that people generally would prefer, in the ab-
sence of other issues, for there to be less illness and injury, and
for those who suffer to be healed.
B. The Background Conditions of the Healthcare System:
Constant Incremental Reform
There is no perfect outcome in health care, and there are no
perfect systems for providing health care. Healthcare systems
seek the least bad outcome, defining success against background
conditions that are both not ideal and constantly shifting. There
are two primary characteristics of these background conditions
that lead to these conclusions: (1) human mortality and fragility
26 0
and (2) the conflict among cost, access, and quality.261 Given this
tension, health care, the industries within it, and the myriad reg-
ulatory schemes that affect it, are all inherently imperfect and
must struggle continuously to achieve the least bad outcomes.
Humans are fragile. Because humans are mortal, no healthcare
system can ever be perfect. Any healthcare system exists against
a backdrop of illness, injury, and disease striking most people at
some time in their lives, and all lives end eventually in death.
Healthcare systems seek to minimize the effects of injury, cure
disease, treat symptoms when diseases cannot be cured, delay
death, and provide comfort and pain relief as unavoidable death
approaches.26" But all health care eventually ends in mortality,
and healthcare providers spend much of their time and resources
making the best of very bad circumstances.263
Within societal schemes to reduce morbidity and mortality,
there is inherent tension among quality, access, and cost, so that
it is extremely difficult to achieve any great success in improving
one (or perhaps two) without constraining another.264 A simple
example of this tension is access and quality for primary care. If a
260. See Donald M. Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & Josh Whittington, The Triple Aim:
Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 759-60 (2008).
261. Id. at 760.
262. See Gary Cohen, What Is the Purpose of Healthcare?, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND.
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.trust.org/item/20140402123148-6vk7g/,
263. Joanne Lynn & David M. Adamson, Living Well at the End of Life: Adapting
Health Care to Serious Chronic Illness in Old Age, RAND HEALTH 4-8 (2003), https://www.
rand.orglcontent/dam/rand/pubs/white-papers/2005IWPI37.pdf.
264. Berwick, Nolan & Whittington, supra note 260, at 760.
[Vol. 50:557
REFORMING HEALTHCARE REFORM
system has insufficient primary care physicians to treat all pa-
tients quickly, it may consider licensing nurse practitioners to
treat patients for fairly simple conditions.265 This will improve ac-
cess (and most likely reduce costs) since it is easier, less expen-
sive, and faster to train a nurse practitioner than to train a
board-certified family practitioner or internist.266 It may reduce
quality in circumstances where a physician will recognize a seri-
ous condition and a nurse practitioner will not. The hope, then, is
to devise a system where this quality issue is minimized, while
improvements to access are maximized.
Even with the inherent difficulties involved, we continually
seek better outcomes, greater access, lower costs, and less waste.
Further adding to the complexity of this endeavor to improve, we
hope to achieve all of this while respecting values that are often
in conflict with each other, such as autonomy and human dignity,
distributive justice, and the ability of societies to protect public
health more generally (societal self-defense, in effect).
The final layer of complexity results because all of these
schemes rely on the behavior of people who are subject to various
desires and incentives and these are extremely difficult to predict
or control.267 While there are occasional bad actors, carried away
by greed or criminal intent, most people involved in healthcare
systems are there, at least in some part, to do good. These people
not only include physicians, but also hospital administrators,
fraud investigators for the government, and people who work for
third-party payers or for-profit pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Even as most of these people seek to do good for others, they are
also vulnerable to altering their behaviors in the face of incen-
tives.68 Any healthcare system is riddled with incentives for types
of behavior. These incentives can be the result of purposeful in-
troduction of financial or cultural incentives, or can be created by
the system itself without purposeful action.269 What is absolutely
265. P. Venning et al., Randomised Controlled Trial Comparing Cost Effectiveness of
General Practitioners and Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care, 320 BMJ 1048, 1049
(2000).
266. Id. at 1052.
267. Erich H. Loewy, Healthcare Systems and Motivation, MEDSCAPE, http://www.med
scape.comviewarticle/551709 (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
268. See id.
269. Int'l Council of Nurses et al, Incentive Systems for Health Care Professionals,
WORLD HEALTH PROF. ALLIANCE 1-3 (2008), http://www.whpa.orgtIncentive-systems for
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certain is that it is far easier to assess the xistence and effect of
incentives in hindsight than it is to understand them with fore-
sight.
If one accepts this description of the limitations and goals of a
healthcare system and acknowledges that, in light of both of the-
se absolute limitations and inherent conflicts, no solution can be
devised, one must accept that change will be a constant in health
care into the foreseeable future. Change comes, of course, from
the desire to improve patient outcomes through research, experi-
mentation, and eventual implementation of new approaches. It
also comes from the need to address societal complexities that are
fluid and value-laden. These complexities are sometimes visible
on the horizon, such as the development of extremely expensive
new medical treatments270 or are unpredictable and can range
from insurance market fluctuations in the face of newly emerging
271 . 2diseases to parental decisions about child immunizations.2 The
health care-professionals-ENG.pdf.
270. For example, consider the recent and continuing struggles with providing Medi-
caid coverage for new and extremely expensive drugs that treat Hepatitis C. For a discus-
sion of this problem, see Soumitri Barua et al., Restrictions for Medicaid Reimbursement of
Sofosbuvir for the Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus Infection in the United States, 163
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 215, 215 (2015).
271. For example, the unexpected appearance of AIDS in the 1980s had a tumultuous
effect on the private individual insurance markets in cities such as San Francisco and
Washington, D.C. For an excellent article from that time analyzing the financial impact of
AIDS, see Henry T. Greely, Aids and the American Health Care Financing System, 51 U.
PriT. L. REV. 73, 74-76 (1989). The article discusses the numerous effects of the AIDS cri-
sis on insurance companies, such as seeking to screen applicants for sexual orientation, id.
at 126, attempting to exclude coverage for all sexually transmitted diseases, id. at 125,
and trying to withdraw plans from areas with high levels of single gay men, id. These ef-
forts were met, in turn, by various state insurance regulatory responses eeking to protect
both public health and private access to health care. Id. at 108.
272. The complex political and personal choices within this issue have been discussed
in both academic contexts and in the press. For a summary of this debate and the underly-
ing evidentiary facts as of early 2015, see Lawrence 0. Gostin, Law, Ethics, and Public
Health in the Vaccination Debates: Politics of the Measles Outbreak, 313 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N, 1099, 1099 (2015), http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2119391.
For purposes of this article, the problem can be summarized as the following: Many states
have historically allowed parents to avoid immunizing their children even though it is sci-
entifically unjustified to do so because the actual numbers of parents who choose to do so
have been quite small and thus have not interfered with the development of herd immuni-
ty. Id. In the last decade, immunization avoidance has begun to reach high levels in a
number of small communities, leading to broad public health threats such as the recent
outbreak of measles in a number of states. Id. The subsequent public reaction from par-
ents who feel their own children are threatened by vaccine refusal has led to an emotion-
laden debate regarding compulsory vaccination and parental rights and exposing, interest-




interaction of these two dynamics adds a further level of complex-
ity to the healthcare system as neither societal shifts nor pur-
poseful reforms exist in a vacuum but must function in continual
response to each other.273
This article does not seek to argue that we should privilege in-
cremental reform above other possible approaches, but rather
that we should recognize that incremental reform is what we do,
and, structurally, what we will continue to do until there is truly
seismic and unimaginable alteration in the human condition.
This needs to be pointed out first because political discussions
about healthcare reform are often misleading at best and can
function as distractions from the significant policy decisions that
continually need to be made. Second, and most importantly, the
current system needs to be more coherently tailored to better
support the reality of constant change.
As is well known, the United States healthcare system is cur-
rently seeking methods for reducing the cost of providing health
care and for improving the quality of health care that is adminis-
tered.274 No system in the world has a perfect method for achiev-
ing the best possible outcome in all circumstances. This is not due
to a lack of good will or effort, since poor outcomes and high costs
are significant drains on society and any country that can mini-
mize these problems will benefit greatly. Rather, it is because of
the inherent challenges described above. Systems constantly
choose between trade-offs. Purposefully interjecting change into
the complex arena that is health care in the United States, a task
we continue to undertake, will assuredly lead to unanticipated
consequences. Some of those, experience tells us, will not be op-
timal.
C. A Proposal for Reforming Healthcare Reform
The case study in this article is the process whereby CMS has
attempted to reduce unnecessary hospital admissions. The ques-
273. See Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care Reform and Social Movements in the United
States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75, 75 (2003) (describing the historical intersection between
social movements and healthcare reform).
274. REDUCING COSTS AND IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE, ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 161 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs
/erp20l3/ERP2013_Chapter_5.pdf.
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tions the article addresses are slightly different: mainly how, in
light of continual changes in the healthcare system, can the Unit-
ed States handle unanticipated negative consequences that
emerge from well-intentioned efforts to improve the nation's
healthcare system? In particular, how can negative consequences
be discovered relatively early and addressed in a nimble and pro-
ductive manner?
A system that may offer some useful comparisons to health
care is the tax system. There are distinct parallels. Like health
care, paying taxes is unavoidable. Similar to healthcare compli-
ance issues, calculating taxes can be extremely complex and there
can be penalties for getting it wrong."' Also, like health care, the
tax system and payers must constantly grapple with unintended
consequences that occur in response to both changes within the
tax code, and changes in behavior that do not neatly fit within
prior experience of taxation.276 Finally, the tax code itself under-
goes constant tinkering in an effort to refine it and ameliorate the
unintended effects, much as healthcare reform must do in order
to respond to unanticipated problems.277
While there are parallels between complexities in health care
and taxation, the tax system has developed methods for dealing
with these complexities that the healthcare system can learn
from. Lawyers who specialize in tax planning are available to ad-
vise people and companies who are risk-averse and seek to mini-
mize tax consequences. The relationship between lawyers and cli-
ents is ongoing, rather than lawyers being hired when problems
arise. While many lawyers currently advise clients on healthcare
regulatory compliance, tax lawyers, who are intimately involved
in both tax planning and tax preparation, know they can com-
municate with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in a number
of ways when there is substantial uncertainty.278 This is a signifi-
275. See Avoiding Penalties and the Tax Gap, IRS.GOV (Aug. 20, 2010), https://www.irs.
gov/uac/Avoiding-Penalties-and-the-Tax-Gap.
276. See, e.g., Gerri B. Chanel, The Kiddie Tax: Inequitable Consequences and the Need
for Reform, TAX ADVISER (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2015/feb/ch
anel-febl5.html (describing the unintended consequences of the "Kiddie Tax" in applica-
tion).
277. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 12
(2014), www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2014AnnualReport (reporting on the frequency of
changes made to the tax code over the last decade).
278. See generally IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 7-9 (2015) (describing letter rul-
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cant difference from health law. For example, the IRS is willing
to issue private letter rulings, where lawyers can submit the de-
scription of a proposed business structure or transaction and the
IRS issues an analysis of the tax implications."9 The opinion let-
ters are made public and bind the IRS for the client who request-
ed it, unless there is a subsequent change in the law or a new let-
ter is issued."' The IRS also issues revenue rulings, where private
letter rulings, with the names redacted, are published and bind-
ing on the IRS, unless a subsequent change occurs.28' There are
also numerous publications read by both the tax bar and the IRS,
such as Tax Notes, which create a daily feedback loop about tax
lawyer and IRS concerns.2 2 Finally, the IRS reserves the right to
prohibit tax avoidance, meaning that a highly effective structure
that appears legal, and greatly reduces tax liability, can be pro-
hibited.283 This, in turn, constrains excessive distortions caused by
unanticipated incentive responses.
While the tax system is highly imperfect and sometimes unjust,
the system itself functions in such a manner that people can gen-
erally go about their business without undue concern about unan-
ticipated tax consequences pringing from their actions.
Healthcare behavior, in contrast, is often regulated by the im-
position of penalties after the activity has occurred. The penalties
can come from many places. CMS and other government agencies
concerned with fraud, cost, or quality are primary sources.8 4 0th-
ings, closing agreements, determination letters, information letters, and oral advice as
means of submitting questions to the IRS when uncertainty arises).
279. See id. at 7.
280. See id. at 59 (discussing the binding nature of letter rulings); Mitchell Rogovin &
Donald L. Korb, The Four R's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity
in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323, 347 (2008) (noting the re-
quirement that letter rulings are to be made public).
281. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 1 (2015) (describing the privacy of revenue
rulings); Rogovin & Korb, supra note 280, at 335 (discussing the idea that taxpayers may
rely on revenue rulings published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin).
282. See generally TAXNOTES, http://www.taxnotes.com/federal-tax-products (showing
the purpose and use of TaxNotes by tax experts).
283. See, e.g., IRS, EO Abusive Tax Avoidance Transactions, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.
gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/EO-Abusive-Tax-Avoidance-Transactions (last visited Dec. 1,
2015) (discussing how some tax-exempt organizations are directly involved in abusive tax
avoidance transactions and providing a means of reporting these abuses).
284. See generally Bob Herman, CMS Imposes Record Number of Medicare Advantage
Fines in First Quarter, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/article/20150413[NEWS/150419982 (describing fines and penalties levied on several
healthcare groups by CMS).
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er sources of financial penalties include malpractice awards being
used as a quality control mechanism and non-government third-
party payers reducing reimbursement for poor-quality out-
285comes.
In response to this dynamic where one learns one was wrong
when the penalties are levied, it makes sense for the culture to be
extremely risk-averse while at the same time unavoidably unsure
as to what the actual risks are that it is seeking to avoid. The
healthcare system tends to respond to perceived threats by seek-
ing out safe harbors,2 6 but given the absence of formal methods
for defining safe harbors in specific circumstances, the system has
limited or no ability to ascertain if the safe harbor is in fact
safe.287 Problems of miscommunication, unintended consequences,
and inefficient use of resources for minimum or no improvement
begin to snowball and can get structurally entrenched.
Medical malpractice is a well-known example of this problem.
While it is not clear how common it truly is, most people are fa-
miliar with the concept of defensive medicine, where a doctor or-
ders tests or performs procedures that she believes are medically
unnecessary but are necessary for the purpose of avoiding a fu-
ture lawsuit.8 The physician seeks a legally unnecessary safe
harbor, at a cost to both the patient and the healthcare system
more broadly. Within the culture of medicine, there are surveys
showing a prevalence of a defensive mentality, with physicians
reporting viewing patients as lawsuits waiting to happen.288
At the same time as state legislators reacted to a perceived
malpractice crisis by capping damage awards and making it more
285. Robert S. Kaplan & Michael E. Porter, The Big Idea: How to Solve the Cost Crisis
in Health Care, HARV. Bus. REV. (Sept. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/09/how-to-solve-the-
cost-crisis-in-health-care.
286. Cecilia Ong & Allen Kachalia, Safe Harbors: Liability Reform for Patients and
Physicians, BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS (Mar. 2, 2013), http://bulletin.facs.org/2013/03/safe-
harbors/.
287. See James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Mal-
practice "Safe Harbors"as a New Role for QIOs?, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1049 (2006).
288. Anthony Rivas, Worried Doctors More Prone to Order Unnecessary Tests to Avoid
Malpractice Lawsuits, MED. DAILY (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.medicaldaily.com/worried-
doctors-more-prone-order-unnecessary-tests-avoid-malpractice-lawsuits-251505.
289. E.g., Dike Drummond, Physician Burnout: Why It's Not a Fair Fight, THE HAPPY
MD, http://www.thehappymd.com/blog/bid/295048/Physician-Burnout-Why-its-not-a-Fair-
Fight (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (describing how the hostile legal environment causes phy-
sicians to view patients as potential lawsuits).
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difficult for patients to prevail in court, the Institute of Medicine
reported that tens of thousands of people died every year because
of preventable errors in the medical system.29 ° The malpractice
system was not doing a good job of policing the quality of the
healthcare system. It was both over- and under-inclusive. It was
over-inclusive because lawsuits were filed against doctors when
there was a legitimate argument that the doctor had followed the
appropriate standard of care, as opposed to a clear-cut failure on
the doctor's part.29' It was under-inclusive because it failed to pro-
vide a mechanism for redress for tens of thousands, perhaps
more, yearly cases where significant harm was done, but not
harm that could be monetized in such a way as to make bringing
a lawsuit worth it for the lawyers.292
Driven by increased awareness about the costs of medical er-
ror, the healthcare system has begun to recognize that medical
errors need to be prevented by reforming structures and systems.
Currently, HHS has a number of programs where it is trying to
develop both carrots and sticks to decrease errors and improve
outcomes.292 While this is a great improvement over relying al-
most entirely on malpractice and occasional licensing revocations
to ensure quality of care, the same risk is inherent here as with
malpractice. How can these programs best be utilized? If the sys-
tem reacts by seeking out safe harbors, if the different parties
view each other as antagonists, and if feedback loops are not built
into the development of new procedures, it is unlikely that the
best processes will be developed. Rather, if penalties are severe
and confusing, defensive measures that are not tied to the best
methods for improving quality of care are likely to develop.
290. Quality of Health Care in America Committee, The Institute of Medicine Report on
Medical Errors: Misunderstanding Can Do Harm, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. (Feb. 2, 2000),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/418841_2.
291. See Claire Bartholome, Leveraging Our Strengths: Reinforcing Pay-for-Perform-
ance Programs as the Solution for Defensive Medicine, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 333, 349-
50 (2008).
292. Id.
293. John Wennberg & Shannon Brownlee, Bending the Curve with Carrots and Sticks,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 12, 2009, 11:10 AM), http://healthaffairs.orgblog2009/11/12/
bending-the-curve-with-carrots-and-sticks/.
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CONCLUSION
The healthcare system can be chaotic, irrational, counter-
productive, wasteful, and riddled with suspicion and distrust. The
healthcare system is also made up of a highly functioning, diverse
group of people, organizations, and regulators who generally seek
to care for those they are responsible for and often have great
success in doing so. Health care itself is inherently imperfect, and
those who spend their careers wedded to it must do so, at least
partially, out of a deep desire to help other human beings who
suffer from disease and injury, even as they realize they routinely
confront systemic and personal failure.
Healthcare reform is inescapable. The system will always be
subject to change and to resource allocation challenges, and so
must exist in a constant state of alteration as society seeks to
make each iteration accurately reflect the values of those for
whom it provides. This article argues that it is essential to re-
main optimistic about the possibility of improvement, to remain
confident in the innate humanity of those in the system, and to
seek to improve the current system so that it can better grapple
with the problems we know will continue to occur. The problems
do not necessarily reflect blameworthiness, but rather the immu-
table characteristics of the challenge of providing health care in
modern times.
The case study about observation status is meant to be illustra-
tive of the need for constant reform. The story is a showcase of
the pressures that have bedeviled health care for the last forty
years, and how strange regulatory and market decisions can ap-
pear in hindsight. The case study also shows the pitfalls of some
specific areas of healthcare reform and how to avoid them.
First, when any party seeks to create incentives for others, it
must be assumed that the incentives will often lead to unantici-
pated outcomes. Incentives are potent, whether they are financial
or cultural, and those who seek to use them should likely refrain
from excessive blame when those who have been incentivized be-
have in unpredictable ways. CMS implemented PPS so that the
healthcare system would be financially incentivized to provide ef-
ficient care. Doctors and hospitals attempted to utilize PPS to
make money, in part by quickly moving patients out of hospitals.
CMS then reacted by forcefully seeking to constrain short-term
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hospital admissions, assuming they were not necessary. This area
has been fraught with blame, fear, and worry for decades.
Second, punitive regulatory frameworks encourage those who
are regulated to become extremely risk-averse. Risk aversion, in
turn, leads people to seek safe harbors. In an effort to avoid as
much risk as possible, attractive safe harbors often fall well short
of regulatory requirements, and this, in turn, can frustrate the
intentions of regulators who have sought o draft rules calculated
to elicit optimal outcomes. Currently, it appears that patient
quality of care and financial well-being are suffering as a result of
physician and hospital reluctance to formally admit them to the
hospital. Patients have been left on stretchers in the emergency
department for days at a time or put in the hospital under obser-
vation status so that hospitals can avoid any punitive interac-
tions with auditors over the decision to admit.
Third, adversarial relationships frustrate quality. Communica-
tion is far more complex when there is persistent distrust.
Healthcare reform requires continual feedback loops so that it
can effectively grapple with changing circumstances, and there
are inadequate avenues for accomplishing this, even putting
aside issues of suspicion. In the case study, CMS, often directed
to do so by Congress, sought to constrain Medicare costs related
to hospital admissions. The series of attempts it made, the reac-
tions, and the counterreactions, became increasingly adversarial.
The utilization of bounty hunters, a method of enforcement re-
jected by western culture more than one hundred years ago, was
a culmination of this adversarial stance. There is much to be ad-
mired in the proper utilization of observation units, but this has
been almost entirely lost in the battle over reimbursement. There
is almost nothing about quality of care reflected in the current
concept of observation and it seems to exist as a reluctant form of
reimbursement at best. This does not have to continue.
Incremental, continual reform is not remotely exciting and is
probably politically unattractive, but it is unavoidable. The sys-
tem should respond to this in a more self-aware manner and
shape itself to better grapple with the types of challenges it will
always experience.
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